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Abstract 
With the development of the cloud computing, recently, many service models have 
appeared which are based on the cloud computing, such as infrastructure as a service 
(IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), software as a service (SaaS), and database as a 
service (DaaS). For DaaS, there exist many security issues. Especially, the database as a 
service cannot be fully secured because of some security problems. This research area of 
cloud computing is called as cloud security. One of the problems is that it is difficult to 
execute queries on encrypted data in cloud database without any information leakage. 
This thesis proposes a secure range query process which is based on a somewhat 
homomorphic encryption scheme to improve secure database functionalities. There is no 
sensitive information leakage in the secure range query process. The data that are stored 
in the cloud database are the integers which are encrypted with their binary forms by bits. 
A homomorphic “greater-than” algorithm is used in the process to compare two integers. 
Efficiency, security, and the maximum noise that can be controlled in the process are 
covered in the security and efficiency analysis. Parameter setting analysis of the process 
will also be discussed. Results of the proposed method have been analyzed through some 
experiments to test the secure range query process for its practicability with some 
relatively practical parameter settings. 
Keywords 
DaaS, Cloud Security, Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption, Secure Range query 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1 Introduction 
With the development of the times, human beings’ activities are much more relying on 
computing ability. These days, the word “Cloud Computing” is frequently being 
mentioned in the area of computational science. Cloud computing is based on distributed 
computing technology which can supply much more powerful computing ability. There 
are many advantages of cloud computing that are mentioned in [1, 2]. A very important 
advantage is flexibility of cloud computing. The cloud service provider can establish a 
cloud with one or more kinds of services in the local domain and supply different, 
customizable, and flexible services to the users at the far-end. Except for computing 
ability, cloud also can supply many other kinds of resources as services, such as storage, 
software, platforms, and even information technology infrastructures. From this, many 
cloud service models are summarized, such as Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as 
a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). The users can use directly these 
services from different functional clouds which are supplied by the cloud providers. 
These service models which are based on cloud computing can reduce drastically the 
costs of information technology for the users. Also, due to flexibility of cloud computing, 
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the waste of computing resources is much more reduced, too. The high utilization rate of 
information technology resources is enabled through cloud computing, that is mentioned 
in [1, 2, 3]. 
According to different positions that cloud is located in, clouds can be classified into 
three categories, which are public cloud, private cloud, and hybrid cloud. Private cloud is 
a kind of cloud which is established by the organization itself in its local domain, and 
used by the members inside the organization. Since private cloud is established inside the 
organization, this kind of cloud has relatively high security. However the costs of this 
kind of cloud are relatively high to the organization. In this thesis, the clouds, which is 
discussed, means public clouds. The features which are mentioned above are also all 
about public cloud which have more details in [4]. Public cloud is provided by the cloud 
provider which contains many kinds of functional services. The IT infrastructures of 
public cloud are set up on the side of the cloud provider, so the users just need to buy the 
usage rights of those services. This means the users’ organizations do not need to 
establish any IT infrastructures locally to use those IT resources, and reduce the IT costs. 
There are some advantages are pointed in [1, 4], such like that public cloud has great 
elasticity, and high IT resource utilization rate. The last kind of cloud is called as hybrid 
cloud which combines the features of private cloud and public cloud. 
The applications of cloud computing are also widely used in business world. The 
prospect of cloud computing in business is also anticipated. Many companies and 
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enterprises all have the demands to use cloud services. However, if they want to apply for 
cloud services veritably and comprehensively into the aspects of business system, there 
are still many practical problems that need to be solved [1, 2, 3, 5]. There are three 
different business models of cloud computing from [1, 3, 5], which can be summarized as 
infrastructures in the cloud, platforms in the cloud, and applications in the cloud. 
Different service models and different users’ requirements should work with different 
business models. This still is a problem which needs to be studied. Cloud computing is 
also playing a very important role in academic world. The probability of using cloud 
computing for science is discussed in [6]. Through IaaS, researchers can execute the 
experiments which need a lot of computing ability. The cloud can provide this computing 
ability by providing the function of its infrastructures. Also, through SaaS, researchers 
can use some large software from the cloud without installing it on their local machines. 
1.1 Cloud Database 
This thesis will focus on one kind of service model, which is the cloud database service 
that is provided by the cloud service provider that is also called as Database as a Service 
(DaaS). There are two main models of the cloud database services which are provided by 
the cloud provider. The first one is that the cloud service provider supplies the platforms 
and virtual machines to the users to run their own databases. The second one is that the 
users can directly use the databases which are provided by the cloud service provider. 
Therefore, the users can store, manage, and access their data on the side of the cloud to 
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enable the functionalities of a database system without installing a database locally. There 
are some features of cloud database service from [7, 8], such as multi-tenancy, scalability, 
and encrypted data. Generally speaking, the users can set their databases with a 
web-based console, such as setting security provisions and configuring the databases. For 
enabling the management process of the cloud database for the user, the cloud provider 
need to design an application programming interface (API) to enable the users to manage 
and control their data in the cloud database. The cloud provider need to ensure all the 
software which is used by the cloud database is visible to the user, including the 
operating system, the database software, and the third party software for database 
accessing and management. Therefore, the user can ensure there is no security and 
privacy threat. The cloud database provider should also do the maintenance and upgrades 
to the software to ensure proper running and performance of the database. The scalability 
and high availability of the database are also the features which the cloud provider should 
ensure. There are three main problems that are unsolved [7]. The first one is the security 
and privacy problem. The second one is the performance problem. Since the 
communication of the information between the user and the cloud database, and the use 
of the database are all based on the network, the efficiency of a cloud database service 
depends on the efficiency of the network data transmission between the user and the 
cloud provider. The third is the operating interface of the cloud database. The cloud 
provider should design an easy-to-use and powerful operating interface for the user to use. 
Although DaaS has many advantages, there still is a very important functionality of 
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normal databases that it cannot enable completely, which is query process. It is known 
that enabling complete query process in a cloud database is still a challenging problem 
for the researchers in this area [9]. The difficult part is how to enable query process 
without any information leakage, in other words, how to run queries on completely 
encrypted data. 
Nowadays, there exit many cloud service providers in this industry such as Amazon EC2, 
Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, IBM DB2, and so on. The cloud database services that 
are provided by these cloud providers have their own features [7, 10]. Users need to 
choose suitable services from a suitable cloud provider. There are three main levels for 
the basic architecture of the cloud services [7, 10, 11]. They are central services, service 
management, and user accessing interface. Central services level is to treat infrastructures, 
platforms, and software as services. Central services should have reliability, high 
availability, and flexibility to satisfy different requirements of the users. Service 
management level is to support central services level to ensure the abilities that central 
services should have and the security. User accessing interface is to ensure the user can 
access the database on the cloud. Performance is also an indicator to evaluate cloud 
database services of the cloud providers. In [12], the researchers evaluate the 
performance of a cloud database service which is based on Amazon EC2. They find that 
the performance of EC2 cloud computing services are still not efficient for scientific 
computing with large data, but they still can provide temporary computing resources for 
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the scientists. 
1.2 Cloud Security 
This thesis will focus on a very important sub domain of cloud computing area which is 
called as cloud security. These days, this cloud security area has become a very hot 
research area. Since cloud security problems may affect the scope and level of the 
applications of cloud computing, the research in this area can benefit the development of 
practical applications of cloud services. 
According to the different objectives of the cloud security issues, these issues can be 
classified into two categories. They are the issues which are faced by the cloud service 
providers, and the issues which are faced by the cloud service users. Some cloud security 
problems faced by the cloud service providers and cloud service users are as follows [13, 
14, 15, 16]: 
1. User Privilege Control – In the process of the cloud services, the cloud service 
provider needs to control and authenticate the user’s privileges for users from 
different organizations as well as the users in the same organization but with 
different privileges; 
2. Information Leakage Prevention – In a cloud service process, the information 
leakage is mainly to three parties. The first one is that the information is leaked to 
a third party except for the cloud service provider and the cloud service user. The 
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second one is that the information is leaked to the staff inside the cloud service 
provider but who do not have the privilege to access this information. The third 
one is that the information is leaked to the user who is in the authorized 
organization but without the privilege to access this information; 
3. Data Loss Prevention and Recovery – The cloud service provider should ensure 
that the data of the users will not be damaged due to some physical or technical 
reasons, and cannot be accessed any more. When the data loss happens for real, 
the cloud service provider should implement some methods to recover it; 
4. Known Attacks Protection – In the process of the cloud services, the cloud 
provider should have safeguard procedures to deal with the known attacks from 
the outside to ensure the security of the users’ data; 
5. Long-Term Availability – A cloud service, especially the cloud database service, 
should have long-term availability, because the time of the first-time data 
outsourcing could be long, and the process needs to involve some professionals; 
6. Complete Database Functionalities – Since most companies and enterprises 
encrypt their data before outsourcing to the cloud due to some requirements of 
privacy and confidentiality, some database functionalities cannot be realized on 
encrypted data without any information leakage; 
7. Building Reputation of Trust for Cloud Providers – This is a relatively new 
problem. The cloud service provider should make the users to believe that their 
 
 
8 
 
cloud services are reliable because of their security and technology, and then the 
user will choose the cloud services from this cloud provider. 
This thesis addresses how to realize secure query process with encrypted data. Query 
functionalities are very important for a database. They can directly affect the performance 
of a database. As mentioned above, the data which is stored in the cloud is encrypted, so 
normal data query process cannot be realized on encrypted data. Only secure data query 
process can be realized. However, there could be information leakage in the process of 
secure queries [17, 18]. It is very important to distinguish what information is usable, and 
can threaten the security of the cloud database and the privacy of the user, and what 
information is worthless. There should be no usable information leakage in the 
applications. In [17], the researchers proposed a method that let the users with different 
authentication levels access the data with different sensitive levels without violating the 
security of the database. In [18], the researchers proposed a secure data query framework 
which is based on an information dispersal algorithm to ensure the security and efficiency 
in the process of secure data queries. This thesis addresses a secure range query process 
which is used a lot in practical applications. 
1.3 Problem Definition 
The central content of this thesis is to use a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme 
to enable a secure range query process in a cloud environment. As shown in Figure 1, a 
cloud service environment consists of three parties, which are the data owner, the users, 
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and the cloud service provider. The data owner can be an organization, company, or 
enterprise. First, the data owner encrypts the data that he wants to outsource to the cloud, 
and then sends the data and some related files to the cloud. These related files can be the 
public key, and the authorizing files for the users. This process is called as “data 
outsourcing”. When a user in the organization wants to access some data in the cloud 
database, first he needs to send a request message to the cloud, and then, the cloud has to 
verify the authority of this user to see if he has the right to access the data that he is 
requesting. If the user is authorized, the request will be executed. Otherwise, it will be 
sent back with a rejecting message. 
Users Data Owner
Cloud Database
Authorize Users
A
cc
es
s 
D
at
a
 
Figure 1: Cloud Environment Model 
The request message contains the range query request and the user’s authorization 
 
 
10 
 
information. The range query request in the request message should have two parts. The 
first part is a set which contains the indexes of the attributes in the database that the user 
wants to query. Denote this set as H. The second part is the lower and upper boundaries 
of the range in the query. Denote the lower boundary as L, and upper boundary as U. If 
after the verification by the cloud, the user has the authority to access the data in the 
query, the cloud should send all the data in the range (L, U) with the attributes in H as the 
results of the query. The reason that this process is called “secure” range query is that 
there is no useful information leakage in the process. 
1.4 Contributions 
The main contribution of this thesis is that a somewhat homomorphic encryption is used 
to enable a secure range query process, since there is a previous study that realizes a 
secure range query process by involving another cloud service provider into the cloud 
environment. This may lead some unknown security problems because that secure range 
query process is under an assumption that the collusion between the two cloud service 
providers is negligible. In the secure range query process in this thesis, there is only one 
cloud that is involved in the process, since the process is based on a somewhat 
homomorphic encryption scheme, and the other process is based on some multi-party 
computation method. 
Another contribution of this thesis is that some parameters are analyzed that are involved 
in the secure range query process. These parameters are the security parameter, the 
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default range for generating the secret key, and the number of the fake bits that are 
appended behind the encrypted binary bits of the integers. These parameters can affect 
the efficiency, security, and the maximum noise that can be controlled in the process. The 
analysis is about how these parameters exactly affect the secure range query process. Two 
parameter settings are found that can handle the 220 and 264 integers to fit the needs of the 
practical applications. A way is proposed that changing the default range for generating 
the secret key to increase the maximum noise that can be controlled in the process for 
handling larger integers in the process. 
1.5 Outline 
The rest of the thesis contains the following contents: 
Chapter 2 shows some previous works about homomorphic encryption schemes, and 
some secure database query processes. Both of them are closely related to the secure 
range query process. 
Chapter 3 introduces some methods that are used in the secure range query process. It 
includes the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme that is used in the process, some 
basic homomorphic operations algorithms, and the homomorphic greater-than algorithm 
that is built based on those basic operators. 
Chapter 4 presents the whole secure range query process, the security analysis, and the 
parameter setting analysis. 
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Chapter 5 compares the secure range query process to the privacy-preserving range 
query process from [35], and shows the results of the experiments and their analysis. 
Chapter 6 is about the conclusion of the thesis and the future work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
2 Related Work 
This section introduces some research achievements that are in cloud security. They are 
all requisite foundational methods for the secure range query processing problem. 
Homomorphic encryption schemes are the most important part for the realization of a 
secure range query process. There also are some methods and problems that are 
associated with the realization of the secure database functionalities, such as the famous 
millionaires’ problem, and the secure comparison algorithms with encrypted data. 
2.1 Homomorphic Encryption Schemes 
First of all, the homomorphic encryption schemes will be introduced. Secure range query 
(SRQ) process is used to execute the range query on encrypted data, and there is no 
information leakage in the process. Since the process is implemented on encrypted data, 
the features of the encryption scheme that is used, at the first place, to encrypt the data 
has a strong influence on what methods should be used to realize the secure range query 
process, and the performance of the secure range query process. Another important 
requirement is that the encryption scheme which is used at the first place must have 
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homomorphic properties. 
Homomorphic properties mean that if an operation is applied on several encrypted values 
(ciphertext), and the decryption process is applied on the result, the plaintext that is 
obtained should equal the result of the same operation that is applied on the 
corresponding values without encryption (plaintext). Through the homomorphic 
properties, some operations can be applied on the encrypted values as can be done on the 
corresponding values without encryption to obtain the same results. This kind of 
encryption schemes has a great possibility to complete the cloud database functionalities. 
Therefore, the importance of this kind of encryption system to cloud computing and its 
services is obvious. 
There are two basic homomorphic operators – addition and multiplication. Let a, b be two 
integers. Addition of these integers in an encrypted form is the homomorphic addition. 
Similarly, multiplication of these integers in encrypted form is the homomorphic 
multiplication. 
Homomorphic Addition - ⊕: 
Decrypt �sk, �Encrypt(pk, a) ⊕ Encrypt(pk, b)�� = a + b; 
Homomorphic Multiplication - ⊗: 
Decrypt �sk, �Encrypt(pk, a) ⊗ Encrypt(pk, b)�� = a × b, 
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where pk is the public key, sk is the secret key, Encrypt() is a function to encrypt values, 
and Decrypt() is a function to decrypt values. 
This kind of encryption schemes can be classified into two categories according to their 
different encrypted objects, which are encrypting the integers directly and encrypting the 
bits in the binary forms of the integers. The one which encrypts the integers directly is 
called as the encryption schemes which have the homomorphic properties. The one which 
encrypts the bits in the binary forms of the integers is called as the homomorphic 
encryption schemes. In this thesis, a homomorphic encryption scheme is used, since the 
secure range query process is realized mainly relying on the homomorphic operations. 
Normally, homomorphic encryption schemes are asymmetric encryption systems, so 
there is a public key (pk), and a secret key (sk). The public key is generated based on the 
secret key, so these two keys are arithmetically related. The secret key is used to execute 
the decryption process and the public key is mainly used to execute the encryption 
process. Specially, for homomorphic encryption schemes, the public key is also used in 
the process of executing operations on the encrypted bits. The reason that homomorphic 
encryption schemes have homomorphic properties is the odd-even properties of integers, 
and the homomorphic properties are realized by that the modulus operation. Therefore, 
although in [21, 22, 23, 24, 25] the key generating processes and the encryption 
algorithms are different, but the decryption algorithms are the same. The decryption of an 
encrypted binary digit c is given by the following relation: 
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m = (c mod sk) mod 2, 
where m ∈ {0,1}, c is the encrypted form of m, sk is the secret key, and mod is the 
modulus operator. 
The one that is put great hope on in the homomorphic encryption schemes is the fully 
homomorphic encryption scheme. The first fully homomorphic encryption scheme was 
proposed by Craig Gentry in his PhD thesis [21]. Craig Gentry presented the first true 
fully homomorphic encryption scheme which theoretically can execute any operations on 
encrypted values. At the first, he proposed a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, 
and then, through the recursive self-embedding method, and the bootstrappable 
encryption method, he converted the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme to a 
fully homomorphic encryption scheme. However, the full homomorphic encryption 
scheme is quite complicated, so in [22], the researchers use Gentry’s method to convert a 
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme to a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, 
but without working with ideal lattices over a polynomial ring, and only involving the 
homomorphic addition and the homomorphic multiplication. This work is much simpler 
than Gentry’s. In [23], Dianhua Tang et al. presented another somewhat homomorphic 
encryption scheme which has a smaller public key and is more efficient. All these three 
works are to encrypt the bits in the binary forms of the integers. 
However, there are still some unsolved problems for using fully homomorphic encryption 
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scheme in the practical applications. Two main problems are the noise control problem, 
and the efficiency problem. In fully and somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes, the 
operations on encrypted bits are executed through some circuits [21, 22, 23]. One kind of 
operations is corresponding to a circuit. Let C be a set which contains all the circuits that 
a homomorphic encryption scheme Ɛ can handle. If for any existing circuit, it can be 
found in the set C, then the homomorphic encryption scheme Ɛ is fully homomorphic. A 
method called Evaluate() can be used to execute the homomorphic operations on 
encrypted bits which needs to use the public key in the process. If the homomorphic 
encryption scheme Ɛ can handle a circuit, then this homomorphic encryption scheme Ɛ 
can execute the homomorphic operation that is contained in this circuit, and the 
correctness of the decrypted result of this operation is also guaranteed. The homomorphic 
encryption schemes encrypt the bits in the binary forms of the integers, and in most of the 
time, the homomorphic operations are also executed on the encrypted bits. However, the 
values of the integers will be changed at the end of the homomorphic operations, since 
the bits in the binary forms of these integers are changed. 
Another important problem of homomorphic encryption schemes is to control the noise. 
In the execution of the homomorphic operations, there is some noise will be generated 
because of the execution of the basic homomorphic addition or homomorphic 
multiplication. Basically, one time of the execution of the homomorphic addition will 
double the volume of the noise, and one time of the execution of the homomorphic 
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multiplication will square the volume of the noise. With the increase of the times that the 
two basic homomorphic operations are executed, the volume of the noise of the result 
also increases. When the volume of the noise hits some boundary which could be the 
value of the secret key sk, or some value that is arithmetically related to sk, and the 
encrypted result is decrypted, the true result may not be obtained. Therefore, the 
correctness of this homomorphic encryption scheme will not be guaranteed. This is a 
basic reason that homomorphic encryption schemes cannot be fully used in practical 
applications. Researchers seem to have a dilemma here. On one hand, when the size of 
the secret key is small, the encryption scheme could lose correctness. On the other hand, 
when the size of the secret key is large, the encryption scheme could lose efficiency. In 
Gentry’s work [21], and also in [22, 23], they use a method called bootstrappable 
encryption method to control the noise. 
Except for the homomorphic encryption schemes, there are also some other encryption 
schemes with homomorphic properties, which encrypt the integers directly instead of 
encrypting the bits in the binary forms of the integers. This is the first category that is 
mentioned before. A relatively early encryption scheme with homomorphic properties is 
RSA encryption scheme. This encryption scheme has already been used for a long time in 
practical applications. This encryption scheme was proposed for the first time by Ron 
Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Lenonard Adleman in 1977 [24]. The letters “RSA” are the first 
letters in their surnames. In their encryption scheme, the key for encryption is public, and 
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the key for decryption is private. The private key holders can sign a piece of message, 
and anyone who is holding the corresponding public key can verify this signature. The 
signer cannot forge, or deny the validity of his signature. At the first, this encryption 
scheme was used for electronic email and electronic fund transfer systems. Another 
famous encryption scheme with homomorphic properties, which also encrypts the 
integers directly, is Paillier cryptosystem [25]. Through Composite Residuosity Class 
Problem, Paillier proposed a public-key based asymmetric encryption scheme. They 
proposed a new trapdoor mechanism, and derived three encryption schemes from this: 
one trapdoor permutation, and two homomorphic probabilistic encryption schemes. They 
only used the basic modulus operation in their scheme, and proved their scheme is secure 
under some appropriate assumptions. Paillier cryptosystem has two homomorphic 
properties which are homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication. Another 
encryption scheme with homomorphic properties is shown in [26]. They present a 
different trapdoor technique comparing to RSA, and proposed a new probabilistic 
encryption scheme. This encryption scheme has homomorphic addition properties. Since 
these encryption schemes do not encrypt the bits in the binary forms of the integers, but 
encrypt the integers directly, for efficiency and simplicity, they have advantages over the 
fully and somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes. However, because of the 
limitation of their homomorphic properties, they can only execute some homomorphic 
operations on encrypted data, only homomorphic addition, or homomorphic 
multiplication, or both to be exact. Theoretically, fully homomorphic encryption schemes 
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can execute all the homomorphic operations on encrypted bits, so fully homomorphic 
encryption scheme is still a research area which is worth to study. 
In the academic circles, there exit some papers about trying to use fully or somewhat 
homomorphic encryption schemes to realize some practical applications. However, there 
are still some serious limitations in all these papers, such as the maximum value of the 
integers that these applications can handle is too small, or the efficiency of these 
applications is too low. A possible reason for these limitations probably is the limitation 
of security parameter choices. In [27], the author discusses the possibility of using 
homomorphic encryption schemes in practical applications. If somewhat homomorphic 
encryption schemes are enough, or the value of the security parameter is not too large, or 
a true fully homomorphic encryption scheme appears, then the homomorphic encryption 
schemes can truly be used in practical applications. There is some research in this area. In 
[28], the researchers proposed an application on a private video streaming service with a 
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. In [29], the researchers presented an 
application which is receipt-free voting based on a homomorphic encryption scheme. 
This thesis is also about using homomorphic encryption scheme to enable an application, 
which is a secure range query process. 
2.2 Secure Database Queries 
Although some cloud service providers provide some secure cloud databases as services, 
these cloud database services do not have complete database functionalities compare to 
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general databases. Therefore, how to enable database functionalities fully in cloud 
database services is still an open problem for researchers. An important one of the 
database functionalities is querying the database in the cloud. Since the data that is stored 
in the cloud database is encrypted, this is quite a challenging problem to solve. In [30], 
the researchers proposed a distributed architecture that can let the organization outsource 
his data to two untrusted servers, but in the process, the organization can still keep his 
privacy. In their work, they show how these two untrusted parties work together 
efficiently and securely, and there is no information leakage to these two parties, or 
outsiders. The researchers also show how to enable secure query processing in this 
distributed architecture. However, there is a problem that the architecture cannot handle 
the collusion between the two untrusted parties. This work is realized under an 
assumption that the collusion between the two servers is quite impossible. In [31], the 
researchers present an algebraic framework which can split the query jobs to reduce the 
computational costs of the client side. 
If fully or somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes are not used to encrypt the data at 
the first, and some encryption schemes with homomorphic properties are used to encrypt 
the data at the first, multi-party computation problem (MPC) should be used to enable the 
secure data query processing. This means the user and the cloud need to communicate 
with each other without any information leakage to each other to work out the results that 
they both want together. The multi-party computation problem was presented firstly by 
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Andrew C. Yao [32] in 1982 through a famous question that is called as the millionaires’ 
problem. The millionaires’ problem is that there are two millionaires, and they both want 
to know who is richer between them, but they do not want each other to know how much 
money they have. Therefore, they communicate with each other in a way that will not 
expose their own secrets, which is how much money they have, to work out a result 
together they both want to know, which is who is richer between them. A formal 
expression is given as: 
f(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) =< 𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑏 >, 
where ri is the output result that the party Pi wants, and si is the secret that party Pi wants 
to keep. 
Multi-party computation (MPC) is very important to the realization of the secure query 
processing, if fully or somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes are not used to 
encrypt the data at the first [33, 35]. 
Except for the original cloud service provider, involving one or more cloud service 
providers in the environment seems to be an available way to solve the secure query 
processing problem. In [33], the researchers proposed a federation of cloud computing 
that can enable secure query processing, and have fine-grained access control of the users’ 
authorities to the encrypted data in the cloud. As mentioned in [32], the researchers let 
two clouds communicate with each other securely to work together for the results of the 
 
 
23 
 
queries. The primary cloud randomizes the encrypted data that the user requests a query 
on, and then sends the randomized encrypted data to the secondary cloud. The secondary 
cloud has the secret key, and uses it to decrypt the randomized data. After the decryption, 
the secondary cloud executes the query and gets the results, but these results still have the 
randomization. The secondary cloud encrypts the results and sends these back to the 
primary cloud. The primary cloud then removes the randomization of the encrypted 
results, and sends them to the user. At the end, the user can decrypt the results to gain the 
true results of his query. In this process, both these clouds cannot know each other’s, the 
data owner’s, or the user’s secrets. The primary cloud uses randomization to keep its 
secrets, and the secondary cloud uses the secret key to keep its secrets. This research is 
also under the assumption that the collusion between the two clouds is negligible. If there 
is collusion between the two clouds, the data will be totally exposed to them, because 
they have the encrypted data, and the secret key for decryption. 
A key technique to realize secure range query processing is secure comparison (SC) 
algorithm [34]. Generally speaking, there are two main ways to realize a secure 
comparison process. The first one is to use fully or somewhat homomorphic encryption 
schemes to encrypt the bits in the binary forms of the integers, and then compare two 
encrypted arrays which are the binary encrypted forms of two integers to gain the final 
result of the comparison between the two integers. The second one is to use the 
encryption schemes with homomorphic properties to encrypt the decimal integers directly 
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instead of using fully or somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes to encrypt the bits 
in the binary forms of the integers. Then, use secure bit decomposition (SBD) to convert 
the encrypted integers to the encrypted binary forms of them. Again, use secure 
comparison to compare the two arrays which are the encrypted binary forms of two 
integers bit by bit to gain the final result of the comparison between two integers [35]. 
In [35], the researchers proposed a framework using secure bit decomposition, secure 
comparison, and multi-party computation to realize a secure range query processing 
called Privacy-Preserving Range Queries (PPRQ). They use Paillier cryptosystem to 
encrypt the integers directly, and then use secure bit decomposition to convert the 
encrypted integers to the encrypted binary forms so that an encrypted integer is an array 
of encrypted bits. Then, they use the secure comparison algorithm from [34] to execute 
the secure comparison process. Two cloud service providers are involved as it needs two 
parties to communicate with each other securely to finish the secure comparison process 
in a multi-party computation way. 
Since the privacy-preserving range queries (PPRQ) method from [35] involves two 
clouds, there probably are some unexpected security problems, like the collusion between 
the two clouds. Therefore, this thesis uses a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme 
to solve the secure range query problem involving just one cloud service provider in the 
cloud environment. Information leakage has to be prevented on two fronts. The first one 
is to prevent the information leakage from the outsiders. Basically, the cloud service 
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provider will guarantee the security of this. The second one is to protect the sensitive 
information from the insiders of the cloud service provider. This depends on the 
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme that is used, and the way that the secure 
range query process is realized. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Preliminaries 
 
3 Preliminaries 
This chapter introduces some existing techniques that are used in the thesis. First, a 
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is presented that is used in the thesis. Since 
fully homomorphic encryption scheme cannot be used in practical applications, a 
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is used to realize secure range queries 
instead of using a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Second, four basic 
homomorphic operators are introduced which will be used to build the greater-than 
algorithm. All these operators are executed on the encrypted bits in the binary forms of 
the integers. Two original ones are homomorphic addition and homomorphic 
multiplication from the nature of the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. Other 
two are built from the two original ones. Then, it shows how to use these basic 
homomorphic operators to build a homomorphic greater-than algorithm that is used in the 
secure range query process. At the end of the chapter, a Java class is introduced from the 
Java library that is called BigInteger that is used to program the experiments. 
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3.1 Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme 
The somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is to encrypt the bits in the binary forms 
of the integers [22]. The data that is involved in the secure range query process is integer 
data. First, these integers in the dataset will be converted to binary form. Then, these 
binary forms of the integers are encrypted. 
Parameters Definition: 
λ: security parameter; the value of this parameter can affect the security of the somewhat 
homomorphic encryption scheme and the controllable noise boundary; 
η: the bit-length of the secret key; the value of this parameter decides the size of the 
secret key and furthermore, affects the security of the somewhat homomorphic 
encryption scheme and the controllable noise boundary; 
γ: the bit-length of the public key; the value of this parameter decides the size of the 
public key and furthermore, affects the security of the somewhat homomorphic 
encryption scheme. 
Let η = λ2 and γ = λ5. Yet the relationship between the values of these two parameters and 
the value of security parameter λ is indeterminate, since this relationship need to be 
changed sometimes to balance the security and the efficiency of the application. 
Then the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is defined as follows. 
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skGen(): the method to generate the secret key p. p can be used to generate the public 
key, and decrypt the encrypted bits to obtain the integers again. In this method, choose an 
odd integer p from the range [2η-1, 2 η) as the secret key; 
pkGen(): the method to generate the public key N. The public key is usually associated 
arithmetically with the secret key, and can be used to encrypt the bits in the binary forms 
of the integers. In this method, choose an integer q from the range [2γ-1, 2 γ), and then, let 
N = pq. N is the value of the public key; 
Encrypt(N, m): the method Encrypt(N, m) takes the public key N and a bit m in the 
binary form of an integer as the inputs, and returns an encrypted form of the bit m as the 
output. For m ϵ {0, 1}, let c be the encrypted form of m. Then c can be computed as: 
c = m + 2r + N, 
where r is a random integer which is chosen from the range [2λ-1, 2 λ); 
Decrypt(p, c): the method Decrypt(p, c) takes the secret key p and an encrypted value c 
as the inputs, and returns the decrypted value of c which is a true bit m as the output. 
Then m can be computed as: 
m = (c mod p) mod 2, 
where mod is the modulus operator. 
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Since this somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is to encrypt the bits of the binary 
forms of the integers in the dataset, one single bit after the encryption process is a single 
encrypted value. For each encrypted integer in some column of the dataset, let 𝑐𝑖 ∈{𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑛}, where c1, …, cn are all the encrypted integers in the column, and n is the total 
number of the integers in the column. Since the integers are encrypted by encrypting 
individual bits of their binary forms, each encrypted integer is an array of encrypted bits. 
An encrypted integer ci will consist of an array of encrypted bits {𝑐𝑖1, … , 𝑐𝑖𝑏}, where b is 
the bit-length of the binary form of the integer ci.  
In the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, the 2r generated in the process of the 
encryption is the noise. The volume of the noise will increase with the increase in the 
number of times the operations are executed, since in a certain sense, every time an 
operation is executed the result is encrypted one more time. Only when the volume of the 
noise is less than the value of the secret key p, the correctness of the decryption process 
can be guaranteed. The somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme has four basic 
operators, the homomorphic addition, homomorphic multiplication, NOT and OR 
operations. The NOT and OR homomorphic operations can be constructed from the 
homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication operators. 
3.2 Basic Operator Algorithms 
In [36], researchers build more complicated homomorphic operators from the 
homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication operators. The four basic 
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homomorphic operators are defined on encrypted bits, that is, encrypted 0 and encrypted 
1 in their execution. Since these four operators are executed on individual encrypted bits, 
the decrypted results of these homomorphic operators do not have any carry bits. These 
operators are not exactly like the binary arithmetic operators but like the logical operators 
on 0 and 1. Therefore, these four basic homomorphic operators can be defined as 
EXCLUSIVE OR, AND, NOT, and OR where EXCLUSIVE OR represents the 
homomorphic addition, AND represents the homomorphic multiplication. 
Basic homomorphic operators: 
EXCLUSIVE OR: is the homomorphic addition operator on encrypted bits c1 and c2 and 
is denoted as XOR. It can be expressed as follows: 
𝑐1 ⊕ 𝑐2 = 𝑐, 
where c is the result of the addition of the two encrypted bits. 
The homomorphic property of this operator is given by: 
Decrypt(p, c) = m = m1 + m2, 
where m1 and m2 are the corresponding true bits of the encrypted bits c1 and c2, m is the 
addition of the two true bits, p is the secret key, and Decrypt() is the decryption function. 
AND: is the homomorphic multiplication operator on encrypted bits c1 and c2. It can be 
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expressed as follows: 
𝑐1 ⊗ 𝑐2 = 𝑐, 
where c is the result of the homomorphic multiplication of the two encrypted bits. 
The homomorphic property of this operator is given by: 
Decrypt(p, c) = m = m1 × m2, 
where m1 and m2 are the corresponding true bits of the encrypted bits c1 and c2, m is the 
multiplication of the two true bits, p is the secret key, and Decrypt() is the decryption 
function. 
NOT: is the homomorphic addition of an encrypted bit c1 and an encrypted 1. It can be 
expressed as follows: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑐1) = 𝑐1 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑁, 1) = 𝑐, 
where c is the result of the homomorphic addition of the encrypted bit c1 and an 
encrypted 1, N is the public key, and Encrypt() is the encryption function. 
The homomorphic property of this operator is given by: 
Decrypt(p, c) = m = NOT(m1), 
where m1 is the corresponding true bit of the encrypted bit c1, m is the decrypted form of 
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c, p is the secret key, and Decrypt() is the decryption function. NOT(m1) can be 
computed by adding m1 and 1 in binary arithmetic without bit carrying. 
OR: is derived from the three previous homomorphic operators: 
c1 OR c2 = (c1 ⊗ c2) ⊕ �(NOT(c1) ⊗ c2) ⊕ �c1 ⊗ NOT(c2)�� = c, 
where c1 and c2 are two encrypted bits, and c is the result of the OR operation on the two 
encrypted bits. 
The homomorphic property of this operator is given by: 
Decrypt(p, c) = m = m1 OR m2, 
where m1 and m2 are the corresponding true bits of the encrypted bits c1 and c2, m is the 
decrypted form of c, p is the secret key, and Decrypt() is the decryption function. m1 OR m2 = (m1 x m2) + ((NOT(m1) x m2) + (m1 x NOT(m2))) 
Table 1 gives all the possible results of the four basic homomorphic operators. Let an 
encrypted bit m be denoted in a form as ENC(m). 
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Table 1: Four Basic Homomorphic Bit Operators and Their Results 
 
c1 c2 XOR ⊕ AND ⊗ NOT OR 
ENC(0) ENC(0) ENC(0) ENC(0) ENC(1) ENC(0) 
ENC(0) ENC(1) ENC(1) ENC(0) ENC(1) ENC(1) 
ENC(1) ENC(0) ENC(1) ENC(0) ENC(0) ENC(1) 
ENC(1) ENC(1) ENC(0) ENC(1) ENC(0) ENC(1) 
 
3.3 Greater-Than Algorithm 
The greater-than algorithm [36] is required for secure range query processing. The 
greater-than algorithm is defined by the function GreaterThan(). This function takes two 
encrypted integers which are two arrays of encrypted bits as the inputs. By execution of a 
combination of the four basic homomorphic operators on the encrypted bits of the two 
encrypted integers, an encrypted result of the comparison of the two encrypted integers to 
find the greater of the two integers can be generated. The decryption of the encrypted 
result will give the comparison of the true values of the two integers. 
Let c and c’ be two encrypted integers, and m and m’ be the corresponding true values of 
the two integers. 
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If m > m’, then 
GreaterThan(c, c’) = Encrypted 1 and 
Decrypt(p, GreaterThan(c, c’)) = 1, which means m > m’ is true.  
If m < m’, then 
GreaterThan(c, c’) = Encrypted 0 and  
Decrypt(p, GreaterThan(c, c’)) = 0, which means m > m’ is false.  
It should be noted that Encrypted 1 and Encrypted 0 include the noise accumulated 
through multiple encryption operations. Since the greater-than algorithm is derived from 
the four basic homomorphic operators, if the volume of noise is under a controllable 
boundary, the greater-than algorithm should also be homomorphic. The greater-than 
algorithm is given in Figure 2. 
GreaterThan(c, c’) Input: two encrypted integers c and c’, where c = {c1, …, cn} and c’ = {c’1, …, c’n} Output: an encrypted 0 or 1 Initialize 
result = Encrypt(N, 0); 
done = Encrypt(N, 0); For i = 1, …, n (n is the bit length)         t1 = ci ⊗ NOT(c’i);         t2 = c’i ⊗ NOT(ci);         result = (done ⊗ result) ⊕ (NOT(done) ⊗ t1);         done = done ⊕ (NOT(done) ⊗ (t1 OR t2)); return result 
Figure 2: Greater-Than Algorithm 
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3.4 Java Class - BigInteger 
To perform some experiments in this thesis to test the practicability of the secure range 
query framework, a test program is required to realize the secure range query process. In 
this thesis, Java programming language is used to realize the secure range query process. 
Since there are some large integers involved in the somewhat homomorphic encryption 
scheme, such as in pkGen(), q is chosen from the range [2γ-1, 2 γ). There are some 
integers which are beyond the boundaries of the primitive integer data types in Java. 
Therefore, a Java class which is called as BigInteger [37] is used from the Java library to 
handle the large integers in the process. 
This class is designed specifically to handle the problems that involve large integers. The 
BigInteger class can provide all the operations of the primitive integer data types in Java, 
and all the operations from java.lang.Math. Additionally, this class also provides modulus 
related operations, GCD calculation, primality testing, prime generation, and other 
complicated methods. 
It is worth to mention the methods to generate big random integers in the BigInteger class. 
Since in the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, some random large integers 
need to be chosen from some default ranges, the methods for generating random big 
integers are given next. The methods are as follows (assume that rndSrc provides an 
equitable random source): 
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BigInteger(int, int, Random): 
returns a random large integer (probably be prime) with the given bit-length;  
BigInteger(int, Random): 
returns a random integer from the range [0, 2numBits - 1]. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Secure Range Query Using Somewhat 
Homomorphic Encryption 
 
4 Secure Range Query 
The query objects of the secure range query are the encrypted integer data by the 
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. Since this range query process is secure, the 
data and every result of every execution of greater-than algorithm is encrypted. 
Additionally, there is no sensitive or useful information leakage to any party that does not 
have the authority to access this information except for the user who requests the query. 
This section first introduces the framework of the secure range query, and then, for some 
security reasons, shows how to hide the real bit-length of each encrypted integer in the 
data set. In this way, the attackers or other untrusted parties can be prevented to 
conjecture the approximate value range of the data set. Next part shows how to realize the 
user access control, since there probably are some users who have no privileges to access 
some data. Then, the correctness and the security of the secure range query process are 
analyzed. At the end, the influence and the setting of some important parameters is 
illustrated which are involved in the secure range query process. 
 
 
38 
 
4.1 Secure Range Query Application 
The form of the data set used in the process is in row-column form. Let the lower-case 
letter s to represent the number of the columns in the data set. As mentioned earlier, if the 
user wants to execute a range query process, he needs to send a request message to the 
cloud service provider. The message includes two encrypted integers and one array. The 
two integers are encrypted by the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme which are 
the lower boundary and the upper boundary of the range in the range query. Let U 
represent the upper boundary of the range and L represent the lower boundary of the 
range. Let 𝓊 denote the encrypted value of U and let ℓ be the encrypted value of L. 
Since ℓ and 𝓊 are also encrypted integers, they are two arrays which contain some 
encrypted bits. The array contains the indexes of the columns of the data set that the user 
wants to query on, denoted as H. Then, the cloud service provider can execute the secure 
range query on some columns. Then a request message to the cloud will be represented 
as: 
Query Request Message: {H, 𝓊, ℓ}. 
Choose an encrypted integer ci from the set {c1, …, cn}, where c1, …, cn are n encrypted 
integers of the integers m1, …, mn in some column. Further, ci consists of an array ci1, …, cib of encrypted bits of the integer with b as the bit-length of the integer.  
Let mi, mj ∈ {m1, …, mn}. 
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If mi > mj, then GreaterThan(ci, cj) = Encrypted 1; 
If mi < mj, then GreaterThan(ci, cj) = Encrypted 0. 
For each ci ∈ {c1, …, cn}, we compute GreaterThan(ci, ℓ) and GreaterThan(ci, 𝓊). 
If mi > U, we will get 
GreaterThan(ci, ℓ) = Encrypted 1 and  
GreaterThan(ci, 𝓊) = Encrypted 1; 
If mi < L, we will get  
GreaterThan(ci, ℓ) = Encrypted 0 and 
GreaterThan(ci, 𝓊) = Encrypted 0; 
If L < mi < U, we will have 
GreaterThan(ci, ℓ) = Encrypted 1 and 
GreaterThan(ci, 𝓊) = Encrypted 0. 
If we do the homomorphic addition (XOR) operator on the two results in each condition 
from the above, only the condition that mi is in the range (L, U) will give us the result 
which is an encrypted 1, and other two will give us the results which are all encrypted 0s. 
Then, we compute 
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for i = 1 to n      for j = 1 to b         cij = cij ⊗ (GreaterThan(ci, ℓ) ⊕ GreaterThan(ci, 𝓊)). 
When mi is in the range (L, U), the result of GreaterThan(ci, ℓ) ⊕ GreaterThan(ci, 𝓊) 
will be an encrypted 1 and in this case the true value of cij in the above computation will 
remain unchanged as its true value is multiplied by 1. Consequently, the true value of ci 
will not change if mi is in the range (L, U). 
When mi is not in the range (L, U), the result of GreaterThan(ci, ℓ) ⊕ GreaterThan(ci, 
𝓊) will be an encrypted 0 and in this case the true value of cij in the above computation 
will be changed to 0 as its true value is multiplied by 0. Consequently, the true value of ci 
will change to 0 if mi is not in the range (L, U). 
The data owner will encrypt the data and in the encryption process, and a public key and 
a secret key will be generated. Then, the data owner will send the encrypted data to the 
cloud service provider for storage, and also send the public key to the cloud service 
provider for using in the future. The data owner will send the secret key to the users 
inside the organization to let them decrypt results. Figure 3 shows the data outsourcing 
process. 
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Data Owner
CloudUsers
 
 
Figure 3: Data Outsourcing Process 
 
After the data outsourcing process, the users inside the organization can request range 
queries to the cloud service provider. As shown in Figure 4, the user generates the request 
message and then sends the request message to the cloud service provider. When the 
cloud service provider receives the request message, after the user authority 
authentication, the cloud service provider will execute the above secure range query 
process on all the encrypted integers in the columns that are requested to query on. 
Then, the cloud service provider sends all the encrypted results to the user. At the end, the 
user decrypts all the encrypted results, and removes the useless 0s to obtain the real 
results of the range query. 
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Figure 4: Secure Range Query Process 
 
Figure 5 shows the activities that are done by the three parties, which are the data owner, 
the cloud, and the user, in the secure range query process. 
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Figure 5: Inside Activities in SRQ 
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4.2 Bit-Length Hiding 
In this subsection, another important technique that is used in the secure range query 
process to enhance the security and protect the privacy of the data owner is explained. In 
the above secure range query process, a hidden security problem is that the number of the 
bits in the binary forms of the integers from the data owner is exposed to the cloud 
service provider. By knowing the numbers of bits in the binary forms of the integers from 
the data owner, the cloud service provider can deduce some relatively smaller ranges of 
the encrypted integers, and, furthermore, can deduce some relatively small ranges for 
each attribute in the database. Because of this, some sensitive information of the data 
owner will be exposed to the cloud service provider, which the data owner does not want 
to be exposed to an untrusted party. Therefore, hiding the real bit-length of the encrypted 
integers in the database is a very important part of ensuring security and the privacy 
protection in the secure range query process. 
The process of bit-length hiding is as follows. 
First, let ci = {ci1, ci2, …, cin}, where ci is an encrypted integer, and ci1, ci2, …, cin are ci’s 
encrypted bits. There are n bits in the binary form of the true value of ci. 
In the keys generation part, we generate another key which is called as the bit-length 
hiding key, which is sent to the user by the data owner. We defined it as h. 
Then, we can build a new value 
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m0 = {0, …, 0} 
encryption
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� c0 = {c01, c02, …, c0h}, 
where m0 is a number 0 (zero) but is expressed with h 0s in its binary form, and c0 is the 
encrypted form of m0. 
Append c0 to ci to gain 
ci + c0 = {ci1, …, cin, c01, …, c0h}. 
Then, we can let ci + c0 hide the real bit-length of ci, and send ci + c0 instead of ci to the 
cloud service provider to store.  
In the secure range query process, we have 
GreaterThan(ci, x) = GreaterThan(ci + c0, x + c0), 
where x is an encrypted integer for comparison. 
Since in the greater-than algorithm, we compare two encrypted integers based on their 
encrypted binary forms through all their encrypted bits, the above equality is tenable. 
Therefore, this bit-length hiding method will not affect the results of the greater-than 
algorithm, and consequently will not affect the results of the secure range query process. 
After the secure range query process, the cloud service provider sends the results back to 
the user. The user decrypts the results, and removes the extra 0s based on the value of h, 
that is the bit-length hiding key that is kept by the user, through the logic shift method, or 
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the arithmetic shift method to gain the real results of the range query. 
Since the number of the extra 0s is another key which is kept by the user, in order not to 
increase the costs of the computation and storage on the user’s side, the same number of 
extra 0s is used for all the integers. This means the same number of 0s is appended to 
each encrypted integer. However, this bit-length hiding key for every encrypted integer 
must be large enough to prevent the detective attacks. However, if the bit-length hiding 
key is too large, it will have the risk to lose efficiency. The bit-length hiding key is 
regarded as a parameter in the secure range query process. Details for setting this 
parameter are given in Section 4.6. 
4.3 User Access Control 
Another important function in the secure range query process is to control the user’s 
authority to access the data in the database inside the organization. Since the users in the 
organization may be from different departments, or at different levels, they may have 
different access authorizations to the different attributes of the data in the database. For 
example, only a few users may have the authorities to access some very sensitive data in 
the organization, and the users from different departments may not have the authorities to 
access the data from other departments. Therefore, we need to control the authorizations 
of the users in the secure range query process. 
In the user authorization controlling method, each user has a unique user ID to verify 
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their access authorization for the attributes in the database. Each user ID has a 
corresponding verification file. The file contains the indexes of the attributes that the user 
has the authorization to access. These verification files are generated by the data owner at 
the first place, and outsourced to the cloud service provider with the encrypted data and 
the public key. 
In the secure range query process, before the user wants to execute a range query, he 
needs to generate a request message. In addition to the content that should be covered in 
the request message, the ID of the user should also be covered in the request message. 
Once the cloud service provider receives the request message, he first checks the 
verification file of the user based on the user ID in the request message. The cloud service 
provider needs to find the intersection between the requested attributes in the request 
message and the authorized attributes in the verification file of the user. The attributes in 
the intersection are the attributes that the cloud service provider will execute the range 
query on. Figure 7 shows the user authorization controlling process. 
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Figure 6: User Authorization Control Process 
 
4.4 Correctness 
This section illustrates how to ensure the correctness of the final true results of the secure 
range query process after the decryption process. Since the homomorphic encryption 
scheme that is used in the secure range query process is a somewhat homomorphic 
encryption scheme, it cannot handle all the homomorphic operations with any depth. 
When the depth of the executed homomorphic operation is increased, the noise that is 
generated in this process also increases. When the volume of noise in the final encrypted 
results is more than the maximum volume of the noise that the somewhat homomorphic 
encryption scheme can handle, the correctness cannot be ensured. This means that the 
user cannot obtain the correct final results of the secure range query after the decryption 
process. Therefore, in this section, the factors that affect the maximum volume of noise 
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that a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme can handle, the arithmetic relations 
between these factors and the volume of noise, and how to guarantee the correctness of 
the decryption process of the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme when it is used 
in the secure range query process will be discussed. 
First, what the noise that is generated in the process of the homomorphic operations 
execution in a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is will be explained. 
The encryption process is as follows: 
c = m + 2r + N, 
where m is a true bit, r is a random integer which is chosen from the range [0, 2λ), N is 
the public key, and c is the encrypted form of m. 
The decryption process is as follows: 
m = (c mod p) mod 2, 
where p is the secret key. 
Since N = pq, in the decryption process, the decryption expression can be changed to 
m = ((m + 2r + pq) mod p) mod 2, 
   that is 
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m = ((m + 2r) mod p) mod 2 + (pq mod p) mod 2. 
Since pq mod p = 0, and 0 mod 2 = 0, the only part that will affect the results of the 
decryption process is  
((m + 2r) mod p) mod 2. 
Therefore, the part m + 2r is the noise that is generated in the homomorphic operations 
process. 
Next, the noise that is generated by the four basic homomorphic operators XOR, AND, 
NOT, and OR, and the upper boundary for the volumes of the noise that is generated by 
these four basic homomorphic operators will be shown. 
Since r ∈ [0, 2λ), and m ∈ {0, 1}, there is 
m + 2r < 2λ + 1 + 1. 
For the homomorphic operator XOR, there is 
c1 ⊕ c2 = (m1 + 2r1 + pq) + (m2 + 2r2 + pq) 
      = (m1 + 2r1) + (m2 + 2r2) + 2pq. 
Since 
(2pq mod p) mod 2 = 0, 
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the noise of this basic homomorphic operator is 
(m1 + 2r1) + (m2 + 2r2). 
Since 
m + 2r < 2λ + 1 + 1, 
there is 
(m1 + 2r1) + (m2 + 2r2) < 2(2λ + 1 + 1) = 2λ + 2 + 2. 
Therefore, the volume of the noise that is generated the homomorphic operator XOR 
must be less than 2λ + 2 + 2. 
For the homomorphic multiplication operator AND, there is 
c1 ⊗ c2 = (m1 + 2r1 + pq)(m2 + 2r2 + pq) 
                      = (m1 + 2r1)(m2 + 2r2) + (m1 + 2r1 + m2 + 2r2 + pq)pq. 
Since 
(((m1 + 2r1 + m2 + 2r2 + pq)pq) mod p) mod 2 = 0, 
the noise of this basic homomorphic operator is 
(m1 + 2r1)(m2 + 2r2). 
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Since 
m + 2r < 2λ + 1 + 1, 
there is 
(m1 + 2r1)(m2 + 2r2) < (2λ + 1 + 1)2 = 22λ + 2 + 2λ + 2 + 1. 
Therefore, the volume of noise that is generated by the homomorphic operator AND must 
be less than 22λ + 2 + 2λ + 2 + 1. 
For the homomorphic operator NOT, there is 
NOT(c) = c ⊕ Encrypt(N, 1) 
                    = (m + 2r + pq) + (m1 + 2r1 + pq) 
                 = (m + 2r) + (m1 + 2r1) + 2pq, 
where Encrypt() is the encryption function, N is the public key, and Encrypt(N, 1) is an 
encrypted 1. 
Since 
(2pq mod p) mod 2 = 0, 
the noise of this basic homomorphic operator is 
(m + 2r) + (m1 + 2r1). 
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Since 
m + 2r < 2λ + 1 + 1, 
there is 
(m + 2r) + (m1 + 2r1) < 2(2λ + 1 + 1) = 2λ + 2 + 2. 
Therefore, the volume of the noise that is generated by the homomorphic logic operator 
NOT must be less than 2λ + 2 + 2. 
For the homomorphic operator OR, there is 
c1 OR c2 = (c1 ⊗ c2) ⊕ ((NOT(c1) ⊗ c2) ⊕ (c1 ⊗ NOT(c2))). 
After simplification, the noise of this basic homomorphic operator is 
3(m1 + 2r1)(m2 + 2r2) +(m1 + 2r1)(m11 + 2r11) + (m2 + 2r2)(m11 + 2r11), 
where m11 is 1, and r11 is the random integer which is generated in the encryption 
process for this 1. 
Since 
m + 2r < 2λ + 1 + 1, 
there is 
3(m1 + 2r1)(m2 + 2r2) +(m1 + 2r1)(m11 + 2r11) + (m2 + 2r2)(m11 + 2r11) < 5(22λ + 2 + 2λ 
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+ 2 + 1). 
Therefore, the volume of the noise that is generated by the homomorphic operator OR 
must be less than 5(22λ + 2 + 2λ + 2 + 1). 
Since the deepest homomorphic operator in the secure range query is the homomorphic 
greater-than algorithm, ensuring that the noise that is generated by this operator is 
important. 
In the greater-than algorithm, three values are definite in every loop in the algorithm. 
They are t1, t2, and t1 OR t2, since these three variables are assigned with the new 
encrypted bits. 
Then, according to volume of the noise that is generated by the four basic homomorphic 
operators from the above, there is 
Noise(t1) < 2(2λ + 1 + 1)2 = 22λ + 3 + 2λ + 3 + 2, 
Noise(t2) < 2(2λ + 1 + 1)2 = 22λ + 3 + 2λ + 3 + 2, 
and 
Noise(t1 OR t2) < 12(2λ + 1 + 1)4 + 4(2λ + 1 + 1)3. 
Since the values of the variables changes in every loop, and the values from the last loop 
are used in the current loop, it is very difficult to find the relations between the number of 
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the bits of the encrypted integers and the noise of the final result. 
Therefore, a Java program is used to calculate the noise values for the bit-length from 1 
to b in the greater-than algorithm. In addition, the noise that is generated in the following 
process should be taken into account, 
cij = cij ⊗ (GreaterThan(ci, L) ⊕ GreaterThan(ci, U)). 
Figure 7 shows the volume of the noise that is generated in the secure range query 
process for bit-lengths from 1 to b in the greater-than algorithm. Here, the security 
parameter λ = 3, and the bit-length of the integers is 10, so that b = 10. Since the volume 
of the noise could be very large, so when b = 10, the trend of the curve can be observed, 
and for different security parameter λ, the curve is shown in Figure 7. As shown in Figure 
7, with the increase of b, the volume of the noise in the final result increases drastically 
from b = 9 to b = 10. The reason that the noise level in the curve for b from 1 to 9 is not 
obvious is that when b = 10 the volume of the noise is much larger than the volume of 
noise for b= 1 to 9. 
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Figure 7: Increment of the Noise in SRQ 
 
4.5 Security Analysis 
First of all, the cloud service provider should guarantee the security of the encrypted data 
which belongs to the data owner that is stored in the cloud. The cloud service provider 
should not let anyone who does not have the access authorization to the encrypted data to 
access the encrypted data in any ways. Except for the leakage of the data, the cloud 
service provider should ensure that the encrypted data that is stored in the cloud from the 
data owner is not damaged or lost. In the event that the data is damaged or lost, the cloud 
service provider should have some measures to recover the damaged or lost data. 
Additionally, there should be some secure channels among the three parties in the cloud 
environment, which are the cloud service provider, the data owner, and the user, to ensure 
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the communication activities and data exchange among these three parties are secure. 
However, all the points from above are not the main parts in this security analysis section 
because the design of the secure range query process hardly can affect the security of 
these parts. Therefore, the next analysis is done under two assumptions. The first 
assumption is that there is no physical data leakage, damage or loss of the encrypted data 
in the cloud. The second assumption is that when the three parties communicate or 
exchange data with each other, there is a secure channel to ensure their communication 
activities and data exchanges are secure. 
The next part of the security analysis is mainly about the secure range query process. 
There are two main parts in the security analysis of the secure range query process. First, 
the decryption attacks from the insiders or the outsiders will be shown. These attacks try 
to obtain the secret key based on some ciphertext and the public key. Once the true secret 
key is obtained by the attackers, the data owner will lose all the secrets of the encrypted 
data that is stored in the cloud. Since defending the attacks from the insiders or outsiders 
mainly rely on the encryption scheme that is used in the process, the first part of the 
security analysis is to analyze the security of the somewhat homomorphic encryption 
scheme that is used in the secure range query process. In the second part, the security of 
the secure range query process is analyzed. In this part, if there is no useful information 
leakage to the attackers from inside or outside the cloud service provider and from the 
users who do not have the authority to access the data will be analyzed. 
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For the security analysis of the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme that is used 
in the secure range query process, the problem is reduced to another problem which is 
called as the approximate greatest common divisors problem (ACDP) [38]. Before giving 
the definition of the approximate greatest common divisors problem, the normal greatest 
common divisors problem will be explained. If there are two given integers a and b, then 
their greatest common divisor can be found in polynomial time. This is the greatest 
common divisors problem. A more formal expression is 
d = gcd(a, b), 
where gcd() is a method to find the greatest common divisor of two input integers. 
When the value of d is very large, the inputs a and b may have some error. In this case 
also, their greatest common divisor can be found in polynomial time. This is the 
approximate greatest common divisors problem. A more formal expression is  
d = Agcd(a + a0, b + b0), 
where Agcd() is a method to approximately find the greatest common divisor of two 
input integers that have some additive error. a0 and b0 are the additive error, and there are |a0| < A, and |b0| < B, where A and B are the boundaries of the additive error that this 
approximate greatest common divisors problem can handle. Their values should be small 
enough compared to the values of a, b, and d. Generally speaking, the costs and 
complexity of the approximate greatest common divisors problem should be relatively 
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higher than the regular greatest common divisors problem. 
There is a kind of deformation of the approximate greatest common divisors problem that 
is called as the partially approximate greatest common divisors problem (PACDP). When 
only one of the two input values has the additive error, the greatest common divisor d still 
can be found. This problem is the partially approximate greatest common divisors 
problem. A more formal expression is 
d = PAgcd(a + a0, b), 
where PAgcd() is a method to partially approximately find the greatest common divisor 
of two input integers where only one of them has some additive error. In the expression 
above, only the input value a has the additive error a0, and the input value b is accurate. 
Theoretically, the costs and complexity of the partially approximate greatest common 
divisors problem should be between the approximate greatest common divisors problem 
and the regular greatest common divisors problem. 
The reason to reduce the security analysis of the somewhat homomorphic encryption 
scheme to the approximate greatest common divisors problem is that the process that the 
attacker uses to recover the secret key of the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme 
is the process of the approximate greatest common divisors problem. Assume that the 
information that is held by the attacker is some ciphertext, then he can execute the 
following process to recover the secret key of the somewhat homomorphic encryption 
 
 
60 
 
scheme 
p = Agcd(c1, c2), 
where p is the secret key of the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, and c1 and c2 are two ciphertext. This attack process exactly is the process of the approximate 
greatest common divisors problem. 
Assume that the information that is held by the attacker is some ciphertext and the public 
key, then he can execute the following process to recover the secret key of the somewhat 
homomorphic encryption scheme. 
p = PAgcd(c, N), 
where p is the secret key and N is the public key of the somewhat homomorphic 
encryption scheme, and c is a ciphertext. This attack process exactly is the process of the 
partially approximate greatest common divisors problem. Once the attacker obtains the 
secret key p, all the data that belongs to the data owner will be leaked to the attacker. 
As shown above, the difficulty of the approximate greatest common divisors problem 
completely reflects the security of a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. If the 
difficulty of solving the approximate greatest common divisors problem is higher, then 
the security of the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is higher. In the 
approximate greatest common divisors problem, if the gap between the greatest common 
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divisor d and the two input values a and b is larger, then the difficulty of solving the 
approximate greatest common divisors problem is higher. Since N = pq, and the value 
that the attacker wants to recover is the secret key p, q affects the gap from the secret key p to the public key N. Therefore, when the value of q is large enough that means the gap 
from the secret key p to the public key N is large enough, the somewhat homomorphic 
encryption scheme that is used in the secure range query process is secure, and it is hard 
to recover the secret key p from some given ciphertext and the public key N. About the 
specific parameter setting to ensure that q is large enough to ensure the security of the 
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, more details are given in the section 4.6. 
Next, if there is no information leakage to the parties who do not have the authority to 
access the data of the data owner will be analyzed. First of all, in the data outsourcing 
process, since the data that the data owner sends to the cloud service provider is 
encrypted, and the bit-lengths of the integers in the database are hidden, the cloud service 
provider or the outside attacker cannot gain any useful information that can threaten the 
security of the data of the data owner in this process. 
After the data outsourcing process, if there is information leakage in the secure range 
query process will be analyzed. First, the user who wants to request a range query on the 
encrypted data needs to send a request message to the cloud service provider. As 
mentioned above, this request message contains the lower and upper boundaries of the 
range in the range query, the attributes of the data on which the query is made, and the 
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user ID. Now, assume that this request message is intercepted by the outside attacker. The 
lower and upper boundaries of the range in the range query are two integers, and they are 
encrypted with their binary forms bit by bit, and the bit-length is hidden. Therefore, this 
information is useless to the outside attacker. The attributes of the data on which the 
query is made is also useless to the outside attacker. The only possibly useful information 
is the user ID. If the outside attacker intercepts and captures this request message, and 
sends it to the cloud service provider camouflaging as the user, then once the cloud 
service provider finishes the secure range query process, and send the results to the 
outside attacker, the outside attacker still cannot get any useful information, since the 
results are encrypted with their binary forms bit by bit. Additionally, the cloud service 
provider can also examine the IP address of the party who sends the query request 
message. Similarly, the request message is also useless for the cloud service provider to 
discover the data owner’s secrets. 
In the secure range query process that is executed by the cloud service provider, all the 
operations are executed on the encrypted data, and the result of the greater-than algorithm 
which is produced every time is also encrypted. Therefore, the cloud service provider just 
executes the secure range query process, and all the middle results are encrypted. The 
cloud service provider cannot gain any useful information from this process.  
After the cloud service provider finishes the secure range query process, he will send the 
query results back to the user. If these results are intercepted and captured by the outside 
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attacker, as mentioned above that the outside attacker impersonates the user to send the 
request message to the cloud service provider, the outside attacker cannot do anything 
with these encrypted results to threaten the security of the data of the data owner. 
The user who wants to query some data from the cloud needs to put his user ID into the 
request message for the authentication from the cloud service provider. After the 
authentication, the cloud service provider will not execute the secure range query process 
on the attributes that the user has no authority to access. Therefore, the user cannot access 
the data that he has no authority to access. 
4.6 Controlling the Parameters 
There are some parameter settings involved in the secure range query process. These 
parameters will directly affect the value of the secret key, the value of the public key, the 
values of the encrypted bits, the volume of the noise that is generated by the 
homomorphic operations, and the boundaries of the noise that the secure range query 
process can handle to ensure the correctness of the decryption process. All these parts 
will affect the efficiency and security of the secure range query process. This section will 
discuss how to set these parameters, and how these settings will affect the secure range 
query process. There are three parameters that affect the efficiency and security of the 
secure range query. They are the security parameter, the range of the secret key 
generation, and the number of the fake bits that is appended behind each encrypted 
integer. At the end, how to set these parameters to balance the efficiency and security of 
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the secure range query process will be discussed. 
4.6.1 Security Parameter 
The security parameter is a parameter in the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, 
and it is also very important for the secure range query process. It is usually denoted with 
the Greek letter λ. In the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, some randomly 
generated integers from some default ranges are usually used to execute the 
cryptographic process, such as the generation of the public key, the generation of the 
secret key, and the generation of the random integer r in the encryption process. This 
randomness, in some sense, provides much more security for the encryption scheme. 
Those default ranges for the randomly generations is decided by the security parameter λ. 
In the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme that is used in the secure range query 
process, three integers will be generated randomly from some default ranges. The first 
one is 
p ∈ [2η-1, 2 η), 
where p is the secret key, and η = λ2. This default range is to generate the secret key p, 
and it can decide the bit-length of the secret key. From the above, η is the bit-length of 
the secret key, and η = λ2. Therefore, the bit-length of the secret key p is λ2. Therefore, 
the security parameter λ decides the bit-length of the secret key, which means the value of p. 
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The second one is 
q ∈ [2γ-1, 2 γ), 
where the public key N is q times of the secret key p, since N = pq, and γ = λ5. This 
default range is to generate q which is the times from the secret key p to the public key N, 
and it can decide the bit-length of q. From the above, γ is the bit-length of q, and γ = λ5. 
Therefore, the bit-length of q is λ5. Therefore, the security parameter λ decides the 
bit-length of q, which means the times from the secret key p to the public key N. Since N 
= pq, the value of q will affect the value of the public key N partially.  
The third one is 
r ∈ [0, 2λ), 
where r is the random integer which is used in the encryption process. This default range 
is to generate r which is the random integer that is used in the encryption process. From 
the above, λ is the bit-length of the upper boundary for the value of the random integer r. 
Therefore, the security parameter λ decides, in some sense, the value of the random 
integer r. Since m + 2r is defined as the noise for each encrypted bit, 2r is almost the 
whole part of the noise. Therefore, we can say that the security parameter λ will affect the 
volume of the noise in the secure range query process. 
Therefore, the value of the security parameter λ can affect the value of the secret key p, 
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the value of q which is the times from the secret key p to the public key N, the value of 
the public key N, the value of the random integer r, and then the volume of the noise in 
the secure range query process. If the value of the security parameter λ increases, then the 
values from the above will increase relatively. If the value of q increases, then the times 
from the secret key p to the public key N will increase. This will increase the difficulty of 
the decryption attack by the outside attacker as mentioned in the security analysis part. 
Therefore, the security of the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme will increase. 
Additionally, the increase in the value of the random integer r also will increase the 
security of the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. However, if the value of the 
secret key p, the value of the public key N, and the value of the random integer r increase, 
the value of each encrypted bit will also increases. Thus, the operations in the encryption 
process, the decryption process, and the secure range query process will have more costs. 
Sometimes, these operations cannot be done in an efficient time on most computers. This 
will lower the efficiency of the secure range query process. There is another effect which 
is on the noise. When the value of the security parameter λ increases, although the 
volume of the noise will increase, the value of the secret key p will also increase. Due to 
the gap between the two ranges for generating the secret key p and the random integer r, 
to be specific, λ and λ2, the gap between the secret key p and the random integer r will 
also increases. Therefore, the increase in the value of the security parameter λ will enable 
the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme to handle much more volume of the 
noise. 
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4.6.2 Secret Key Generation 
Another part which is very important to the secure range query process is the default 
range for generating the secret key p in the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. 
The default range usually is 
p ∈ [2η-1, 2 η). 
As mentioned before, η is the bit-length of the secret key p which is generated within the 
range above randomly. In general case, η = λ2 that means λ2 is the bit-length of the secret 
key p. 
However, when the bit-length of the secret key p is λ2, sometimes the noise which is 
generated in the secure range query process probably cannot be handled. As mentioned 
before, the volume of the noise usually is decided by two parts. The first one is the 
number of the homomorphic operations that are executed in the secure range query 
process. The second one is the default range for generating the random integer r in the 
encryption process. The range, which is [0, 2λ) generally, is default and usually not 
changeable. Therefore, the only part that will affect the volume of the noise is the number 
of homomorphic operations that are executed in the secure range query process. If, in the 
secure range query process, there are too many homomorphic operations, probably 
because the integers in the database are too large which implies that the binary forms of 
the integers have too many bits, too much noise may be generated in the process and will 
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be beyond the maximum noise that the secure range query process can handle. Due to this, 
the correctness of the decryption process may be lost. However, the volume of noise is 
hard to decrease, no matter decreasing the range for generating the random integer r, or 
decreasing the number of homomorphic operations in the secure range query process. 
Therefore, there is a way that can increase the maximum volume of noise that can be 
handled in the secure range query process. Changing the default range for generating the 
secret key p is a way to increase the maximum volume of noise that can be handled in the 
secure range query process. 
Increasing the bit-length of the secret key p can increase the maximum volume of noise 
that can be handled in the secure range query process. The bit-length of the secret key p 
is usually λ2, and the default range for generating the random integer r in the encryption 
process is [0, 2λ). When the secure range query process is running, more and more 
homomorphic operations are executed, and then more and more different values of r are 
accumulated to generate the noise. The association between the bit-length of the secret 
key p and the security parameter λ can be changed, instead of just increasing the security 
parameter. If the bit-length of the secret key p is changed to λ3, then the value of the 
secret key is increased with the same value of the security parameter λ. Yet, the default 
range for generating the random integer r in the encryption process is still [0, 2λ). This 
illustrates that the gap between the secret key p and the value of r which can generate the 
noise is increased. At this time, if the value of the security parameter λ is increased, more 
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noise can be handled without losing relatively too much efficiency. However, this way 
will lose some security. Not only the bit-length of the secret key p can be changed to λ3, it 
can also be changed to other powers of λ. Details will be given in Section 5.2. 
4.6.3 Bit-Length Hiding 
Another security arrangement which is a very important parameter in the secure range 
query process is the number of the fake bits appended behind the encrypted binary forms 
of the integers. As mentioned before, there are some encrypted 0s that are appended 
behind the encrypted binary forms of the integers to hide the real bit-length of the 
integers in the database to avoid the detective attacks from the outsiders. 
However, although these fake bits can improve the security of the secure range query 
process, they also increase the costs and the noise. Recalling the secure greater-than 
algorithm presented before, when the bit-length of two integers is increased, the volume 
of noise that is generated by the algorithm will also increase. For every single increase of 
one bit, the volume of noise will increase greatly. Assume that although the volume of the 
noise increases a lot, the noise still can be handled with some pretty good parameter 
settings. However, the increase of the volume of noise will lead much larger values for 
the homomorphic operations, and much larger final results of the secure range query. This 
will have a big loss for the computational efficiency and the communication efficiency of 
the secure range query process. Therefore, the number of the fake bits appended behind 
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the encrypted binary forms of the integers is quite a difficult decision to make. In Section 
5.2, the specific value settings for this parameter will be discussed. 
4.6.4 Balance between Efficiency and Security 
In this part, the balance between the efficiency and the security of the secure range query 
process will be discussed. This discussion is under an assumption that the noise that is 
generated in the secure range query process can be handled, since if the volume of noise 
is beyond the maximum volume that the secure range query process can handle, the final 
results will not be correct in the decryption process. The efficiency and the security of the 
secure range query process will lose their meaning. 
The efficiency and the security of the secure range query process have an opposite 
relationship. Generally speaking, if the efficiency increases, the security will decreases 
and vice versa with some changings of the parameters. In the security parameter part, if 
the security parameter λ increases, the value of q will increase, and then the times from 
the secret key p to the public key N will also increase. At the end, the security will 
increase. However, if the value of the secret key p and the value of the public key N 
increase, the value of each encrypted bit will also increases and decreases the efficiency. 
Therefore, the practical situations need to be considered, like the values of the integers in 
the database, and the settings of other parameters, to decide the value of the security 
parameter λ. 
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Then, the default range for generating the secret key p is discussed. Although increasing 
the bit-length of the secret key p (not increase the value of λ directly) will increase the 
maximum volume of noise that can be handled in the secure range query process, the 
security will be lost, since the times from the secret key p to the public key N is 
decreased. This also is an important parameter setting that need to be balanced. 
At the end, the effect that the number of fake bits which are appended behind the 
encrypted binary forms of the integers to the secure range query process is illustrated. 
This is a relatively simple problem, since the more fake bits being appended will give 
more security to the secure range query but lose efficiency. Therefore, a boundary of the 
number of fake bits need to be decided to ensure greatest security but not to lose 
unacceptable efficiency in the secure range query process. The parameters which will 
affect the secure range query process are discussed and how these parameters affect the 
efficiency and the security of the secure range query process. The specific parameter 
setting will be given in Section 5.2. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Implementation and Results 
 
5 Secure Range Query Process 
In this chapter, firstly, the secure range query process is compared to the 
privacy-preserving range query process (PPRQ) from [35] to analyze their computational 
costs, data transmission costs, communication complexity, and summarize their 
advantages and disadvantages with each other. Finally, the contributions of the secure 
range query process can be shown. Then, the implementation of the secure range query is 
presented. The structure of the program for realizing the secure range query process is 
shown. Some experiments are designed to study the security and efficiency of the secure 
range query process with different parameter settings to find some relatively practical 
parameter settings. 
5.1 Comparison with PPRQ 
In this section, every sub process of the privacy-preserving range query process and the 
secure range query process to will be compared. The two processes are compared in three 
aspects. The first aspect is computational costs. The number of the basic operations on 
large integers in these two processes is count, which are basically addition, subtraction, 
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multiplication, and division. The results are compared to find out which one has 
relatively less computational costs than the other. Thus, if the programming environment 
is the same, the one that has less computational costs will be the one that has a high 
computational efficiency between these two processes. 
The second part in the comparison is the data transmission costs. The size of the data that 
is transmitted in each communication round among the three parties, which are the cloud 
service provider, the data owner, and the user, in the cloud environment are compared. If, 
with the same network data transmission rate, the one that has the less size of the total 
transmitted data in all the communication rounds will be the process that has a higher 
data transmission efficiency between the two processes. 
The third part is the comparison of the communication complexity of the two processes. 
In this part, the number of communication rounds around the three parties in the cloud 
environment will be counted. If the communication activities are frequent and it is hard to 
determine if the data that is transmitted in each communication round will affect the 
security of the process, reducing the number of the communication rounds is a good way 
to prevent the sensitive information leakage. This part is mainly for the 
privacy-preserving range query process, since the communication complexity of the 
secure range query process is simplest. 
The privacy-preserving range query process and the secure range query process are 
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divided into three processes for comparison. The first process is the encryption process. 
In this process, the computational costs in the encryption process and the size of the data 
after the encryption process are compared. The second process is the query process. In 
this process, the computational costs in the process, the sizes of the final encrypted results, 
and the communication round complexity are compared. The third process is the 
decryption process. In this process, the computational costs in the decryption process are 
compared. At the end, the advantages and disadvantages of the secure range query 
process compared to the privacy-preserving range query process are finally summarized. 
For the convenience of the calculations, let there be n integers in a column in the 
database, the average bit-length of these integers be b, so the average true value of an 
integer m is given by 
m = 2b−1+2b
2
= 3 × 2b−2. 
Let the number of the fake bits that are appended behind the encrypted binary forms of 
the integers in the secure range query process be h, and the security parameter be λ. 
5.1.1 Encryption Process 
The encryption process and data outsourcing process for the privacy-preserving range 
query process and the secure range query process will be compared in three parts,  
which are computational efficiency, data transmission efficiency, and communication 
round complexity. 
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The encryption scheme that is used in the secure range query process is the somewhat 
homomorphic encryption scheme, but the encryption scheme that is used in the 
privacy-preserving range query process is the Paillier cryptosystem, which is an 
encryption scheme that has some homomorphic properties. The Paillier [25] 
cryptosystem is as follows: 
Key Generation: 
N = pq, 
where p and q are two large random prime integers; 
λ′ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) = (p−1)(q−1)
gcd (p−1,q−1), 
g ∈ ZN2∗ , 
where ZN2∗  is the set of nonzero integers modulo N2; 
L(x) = x−1
N
, 
µ = (L(gλ′modN2))−1modN; 
Encryption: 
c = gmrNmodN2, 
where m is an integer, and r ∈ ZN∗  that is the set of nonzero integers modulo N; 
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Decryption: 
m = L(cλ′modN2)µmodN. 
For the security reason, the bit-length of the parameter N usually is 1024, which means 
21023 ≤ N < 21024, 
so let 
N = 21023+21024
2
= 3 × 21022. 
For the computational costs, since the average size of the parameter N in Paillier 
cryptosystem is very large, the basic operations in the encryption process are all on large 
integers that is the same with the encryption process of the somewhat homomorphic 
encryption scheme. The computational costs of encrypting a whole column will be 
calculated including the keys generation costs. There are n integers in the column. 
From the above, the computational costs of the keys generation part approximately are 
λ′ + Ogcd(p − 1, q − 1), 
where Ogcd(p − 1, q − 1) is the number of the operations that are executed in gcd(p – 1, q - 1). 
The computational costs of the encryption part approximately are 
 
 
77 
 
(3 × 2b−2 + 3 × 21022)n. 
Therefore, the computational costs of the Paillier cryptosystem in this process are 
�3 × 2b−2 + 3 × 21022�n + λ′ + Ogcd(p − 1, q − 1). 
The computational costs of the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme in this 
process approximately are 
3(b + h). 
From the above results, it is obvious to see that the computational costs of the Paillier 
cryptosystem is far more than the computational costs of the somewhat homomorphic 
encryption scheme in the encryption process. 
For the data transmission costs, since g ∈ ZN2∗ , and g is a nonzero integer, 
1 ≤ g ≤ 𝑁2 − 1. 
Therefore, according to the average value of N, the average value of g is given as 
g = 𝑁2−1+1
2
= 3×21023
2
= 3 × 21022. 
Since the average value of m is 3 × 2b−2, the average value of gm is 
𝑔𝑚 = (3 × 21022)3×2b−2. 
Since r ∈ ZN∗ , and r is a nonzero integer, 
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1 ≤ r ≤ N − 1. 
Therefore, according to the average value of N, the average value of r is given as 
r = 𝑁−1+1
2
= 3×21022
2
= 3 × 21021, and 
the average value of rN is 
𝑟𝑁 = (3 × 21021)3×21022. 
Therefore, the size of one encrypted integer in the encryption process of the Paillier 
cryptosystem is calculated. The size of the encrypted integer is 
(3 × 21022)3×2b−2(3 × 21021)3×21022mod(3 × 21023). 
Since the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme in the secure range query process 
is to encrypt the bits in the binary forms of the integers, for one encrypted integer, the 
sizes of all its encrypted bits should be the size of this integer after encryption. According 
to the default ranges for generating the secret key p, q, and r, the average value of N and 2r are 
N = 2𝜆4−1+2𝜆4−1
2
× 2𝜆5−1+2𝜆5−1
2
≈ 2𝜆5+𝜆4−1 + 2𝜆5+𝜆4−4, and 
2r = 2 2𝜆−1+2𝜆−1
2
≈ 2𝜆 + 2𝜆−1. 
The formula m + 2r + N is to compute one encrypted bit, and there are b bits in an 
encrypted integer. Therefore, the size of one encrypted integer in the encryption process 
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of the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is 
�2𝜆5+𝜆4−1 + 2𝜆5+𝜆4−4 + 2𝜆 + 2𝜆−1�b. 
where the secret key p is randomly generated from the default range [2𝜆4−1, 2𝜆4) because 
this secret key generation can be practical for some real data. 
Due to the uncertainty of the security parameter and the secret key generation, a program 
is written to compare the sizes of the two single encrypted integers which are encrypted 
by these two encryption schemes. The results show that no matter what parameter 
settings are, the size of one encrypted integer from the somewhat homomorphic 
encryption scheme is always larger than the size of one encrypted integer from the 
Paillier cryptosystem. This illustrates that the data transmission cost of the secure range 
query process is more than the data transmission costs of the privacy-preserving range 
query process in the data outsourcing process. 
Since there is only one communication activity that happens in the encryption process 
which is the data outsourcing for both range query processes, it is not necessary to 
compare the communication round complexity in this part. 
5.1.2 Query Process 
The first step to compare the two secure range query processes is to analyze the query 
generating process on the user’s side. Since the only communication activity in this 
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process is that the user sends the query request message to the cloud service provider, the 
two range query processes are the same with respect to the communication complexity. 
Therefore, only the computational costs and the data transmission costs will be analyzed. 
The computational costs in the query generating process are just the costs of encrypting 
two integers which are the lower and upper boundaries of the range in the query. 
Since the computational costs for encrypting one integer of the encryption part in the 
privacy-preserving range query process approximately are 
3 × 2b−2 + 3 × 21022. 
Therefore, the computational costs of the query generating process for the 
privacy-preserving range query process approximately are 
3 × 2b−1 + 3 × 21023. 
The computational costs for the secure range query process in the query generating 
process are 
6(b + h). 
From the above results, the computational costs of the privacy-preserving range query 
process is far more than the computational costs of the secure range query process in the 
query generating process. 
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In the comparison of the encryption and data outsourcing process, for each encrypted 
integer, the secure range query process generates the encrypted data files with larger sizes 
than the privacy-preserving range query process. Therefore, in the query generating 
process, the secure range query process generates the query files with larger sizes than the 
privacy-preserving range query process, since the main parts of the query files are the 
two encrypted integer boundaries of the range in the query. The data transmission costs of 
the privacy-preserving range query process are less than the data transmission costs of the 
secure range query process in the query generating process. 
Compared to the secure range query process, the privacy-preserving range query process 
is much more complicated. There are three sub processes in the query process of the 
privacy-preserving range query process. They are the secure bit decomposition process, 
secure comparison process, and the privacy-preserving range query process. The total 
costs for the privacy-preserving range query process consists of the sum of the 
computational costs and the data transmission costs of the three sub processes. 
In the cloud environment of the privacy-preserving range query process, there are two 
cloud service providers. The first one is the primary cloud service provider, and the 
second one is the secondary cloud service provider. The primary cloud finishes the secure 
bit decomposition process by communicating with the secondary cloud. Since the parties 
that should be cared most is the user and the data owner, the data transmission costs of 
the communication rounds between the two clouds will not be counted. 
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In the secure bit decomposition process of the privacy-preserving range query process, 
the two clouds work together to convert the encrypted integers to the encrypted binary 
forms wit encrypted bits through communicating with each other securely. The 
communication details between the two clouds are quite complicated, and can be found in 
[35]. Based on the secure bit decomposition process, the computational costs of the 
primary cloud are 
(2λ′ + 3 × 21023 + 26)b(n + 2), and 
the computational costs of the secondary cloud are 
�3 × 2𝑏−1 + 9 × 21023 + 3 × 21020 + 18 + 3
2
� b(n + 2). 
The secure comparison process and the range query process are considered together. In 
this part, there is no need to count the computational costs, since just the other 
computational cost is already much larger than the computational costs of the query 
process of the secure range query process. Denote the computational costs of the primary 
cloud as A1, and the computational costs of the secondary cloud as A2 in this part. 
Therefore, the total computational costs of the primary cloud in the query process are 
(2λ′ + 3 × 21023 + 26)b(n + 2) + A1, and 
the total computational costs of the secondary cloud in the query process are 
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�3 × 2b−1 + 9 × 21023 + 3 × 21020 + 18 + 3
2
�b(n + 2) + A2. 
The computational costs of the secure range query process in the query process are 
36(b + bk)2n + 2(b + h)n. 
Form the above results, it is obvious that no matter the computational costs of the primary 
cloud or the secondary cloud, they are all far more than the computational costs of the 
secure range query process in the query process. 
In the comparison of the encryption and data outsourcing process, for each encrypted 
integer, the secure range query process generates the encrypted data files with larger sizes 
than the privacy-preserving range query process. Also, the encrypted query results in the 
secure range query process are equivalent to encrypt the integers more times, so the sizes 
of them will also increase more times, but in the privacy-preserving range query process, 
the encrypted query results are just equivalent to encrypt the integers one time. 
Therefore, for the data transmission costs, it is obvious that the data transmission costs of 
the privacy-preserving range query process is less than the data transmission costs of the 
secure range query process in the query process. 
Since there is no communication round in the query process of the secure range query 
process, and there are some communication rounds between the primary cloud and the 
secondary cloud in the secure comparison process of the privacy-preserving range query 
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process, the secure range query process has less communication round complexity than 
the privacy-preserving range query process. 
5.1.3 Decryption Process 
In the decryption process, only the computational costs of the privacy preserving range 
query process and the secure range query process will be considered, since all the 
decrypting operations happens on the user’s side, there is no data transmission and 
communication round in this process. 
Assume that there are R encrypted values in the results of the range query. For the 
privacy-preserving range query process, the computational costs of the decryption 
process are 
(λ′ + 9)R. 
For the secure range query process, the computational costs of the decryption process are 
6(b + h)R. 
Since the parameter λ’ = lcm(p – 1, q - 1), and p and q are two large prime integers in the 
Paillier cryptosystem, the computational costs of the privacy-preserving range query 
process is far more than the computational costs of the secure range query process in the 
decryption process. 
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5.1.4 Comparison between PPRQ and SRQ 
After all the comparisons in the previous subsections, the advantages and disadvantages 
of the secure range query process compared to the privacy-preserving range query 
process will be summarized and listed. 
Advantages: 
1. The computational efficiency of the secure range query process is higher than that 
of the privacy-preserving range query process in the encryption process; 
2. There is only one cloud service provider that is involved in the cloud environment 
in the secure range query process. Therefore, there is no any communication 
round complexity in the secure range query process compared to the 
privacy-preserving range query process; 
3. The computational efficiency of the secure range query process is higher than that 
of the privacy-preserving range query process in the query generating process; 
4. Fake bits are not appended behind the encrypted integers to hide the real 
bit-length of the integers in the privacy-preserving range query process, since the 
Paillier cryptosystem encrypts the integers directly. Therefore, the secure range 
query process is more secure than the privacy-preserving range query process in 
this part; 
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5. The computational efficiency of the secure range query process is higher than that 
of the privacy-preserving range query process in the decryption process; 
6. In the secure range query process, no middle results will be known by the cloud 
service provider in the query process. The primary cloud in the privacy-preserving 
range query process knows all the middle results of the query process. Therefore, 
the secure range query process is securer than the privacy-preserving range query 
process in this part; 
7. The computational efficiency of the secure range query process is higher than that 
of the privacy-preserving range query process in the query process. 
Disadvantages: 
1. The original encrypted data in the secure range query process is larger than the 
original encrypted data in the privacy-preserving range query process; 
2. The query request file in the secure range query process is larger than the query 
request file in the privacy-preserving range query process; 
3. For the purpose of controlling the noise, the bit-length of the secret key p is 
increased, not just increase the value of the security parameter λ, but change the 
mathematical relation between the parameter η and λ in the somewhat 
homomorphic encryption scheme. This will decrease the gap between the secret 
key p and the public key N, which leads the loss in the security of the process. 
There is no such problem in the privacy-preserving range query process, since it 
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uses a very large parameter N in the encryption process of the Paillier 
cryptosystem; 
4. Since the cloud service provider does not know the middle results in the query 
process, the final query results can be quite large. This loses some data 
transmission efficiency compared to the privacy-preserving range query process. 
In conclusion, the secure range query process is faster, but generates larger files. However, 
the privacy-preserving range query process is slower, but generates smaller files. 
5.2 Experiments & Results 
In this section, some experiments are designed to test the practicability of the secure 
range query process, and the results of the experiments are illustrated. First, some tables 
are presented to show the security parameter λ that can enable the secure range query 
process for different values of the integers in the database with the different secret key 
generations. Then, some relatively practical parameter settings are chosen to run the 
secure range query process with some datasets whose values are practical. Finally, the 
practicability of the secure range query process is discussed. 
In [35], if the maximum value of the integers that the secure data range query process can 
handle is 220, then this secure range query can be used in most practical applications. For 
covering more practical applications, the largest integer in the tables is set to be 264. 
Although some practical applications may involve the integers whose values are 2128, but 
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this value is too large to handle by the secure range query process, since it will lose 
efficiency. The ability to handle integers whose values are 264 is enough for the secure 
range query process to have a considerable degree of practicability. Tables 2 to 4 show 
the settings of the security parameters for three different secret key generations with p ∈ [2𝜆4−1, 2𝜆4), p ∈ �2𝜆5−1, 2𝜆5�, and p ∈ [2𝜆6−1, 2𝜆6). Since it is hard to calculate all 
the security parameters for the integers from 2 to 264 with different secret key generations, 
the following tables are generated by a computer program. 
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Table 2: Security Parameters for First Secret Key Generation 
 
bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ 
1 3 12 8 23 11 34 14 45 17 56 19 
2 3 13 8 24 11 35 15 46 17 57 20 
3 4 14 8 25 12 36 15 47 17 58 20 
4 4 15 9 26 12 37 15 48 18 59 20 
5 5 16 9 27 12 38 15 49 18 60 20 
6 5 17 9 28 13 39 16 50 18 61 21 
7 6 18 10 29 13 40 16 51 18 62 21 
8 6 19 10 30 13 41 16 52 19 63 21 
9 6 20 10 31 13 42 16 53 19 64 21 
10 7 21 11 32 14 43 16 54 19   
11 7 22 11 33 14 44 17 55 19   
Table 2 shows the security parameters λ for the integers from 2 to 264 for the secret key 
generation p ∈ [2𝜆4−1, 2𝜆4). 
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Table 3: Security Parameters for Second Secret Key Generation 
 
bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ 
1 2 12 5 23 7 34 8 45 9 56 10 
2 3 13 5 24 7 35 8 46 9 57 10 
3 3 14 5 25 7 36 8 47 9 58 10 
4 3 15 5 26 7 37 8 48 9 59 10 
5 3 16 6 27 7 38 8 49 9 60 10 
6 4 17 6 28 7 39 8 50 9 61 10 
7 4 18 6 29 7 40 8 51 9 62 10 
8 4 19 6 30 7 41 9 52 9 63 10 
9 4 20 6 31 8 42 9 53 10 64 10 
10 5 21 6 32 8 43 9 54 10   
11 5 22 6 33 8 44 9 55 10   
Table 3 shows the security parameters λ for the integers from 2 to 264 for the secret key 
generation of p ∈ [2𝜆5−1, 2𝜆5). 
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Table 4: Security Parameters for Third Secret Key Generation 
 
bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ bit-length λ 
1 2 12 4 23 5 34 6 45 6 56 7 
2 2 13 4 24 5 35 6 46 6 57 7 
3 3 14 4 25 5 36 6 47 6 58 7 
4 3 15 4 26 5 37 6 48 6 59 7 
5 3 16 4 27 5 38 6 49 6 60 7 
6 3 17 4 28 5 39 6 50 6 61 7 
7 3 18 4 29 5 40 6 51 6 62 7 
8 3 19 5 30 5 41 6 52 6 63 7 
9 4 20 5 31 5 42 6 53 6 64 7 
10 4 21 5 32 5 43 6 54 6   
11 4 22 5 33 5 44 6 55 7   
Table 4 shows the security parameters λ for the integers from 2 to 264 for the secret key 
generation of p ∈ [2𝜆6−1, 2𝜆6). 
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In Table 2, when p ∈ [2𝜆4−1, 2𝜆4), if the maximum value of the integers in the database 
is 264 and the secure range query process for this size integers need to be enabled, the 
value of the security parameter λ should be 21. That will generate really large encrypted 
data and middle results in the encryption process and the query process. Therefore, the 
secret key generation p ∈ [2𝜆4−1, 2𝜆4) is not practical for the integers that large like 264 
because it will not be efficient. However, for the integers whose values are 220, the value 
of the security parameter λ is just 10, which will be enough to handle the noise problem 
in the secure range query process, and will also be pretty efficient. 
When p ∈ [2𝜆5−1, 2𝜆5) , the most exciting results are obtained. In Table 3, if the 
maximum value of the integers in the database is 264, and the secure range query process 
with integers that are large like this need to be enabled, the value of the security 
parameter λ should be 10. This is quite less than the value in Table 2, since each addition 
of the security parameter will increase a lot of costs. This parameter setting has already 
been pretty practical. For the integers whose values are 220, the value of the security 
parameter λ should only be 6 that will be enough to handle the noise problem in the 
secure range query process and will also be pretty efficient. 
When p ∈ [2𝜆6−1, 2𝜆6), much security will be lost, since the value of p is more than the 
value of q. This will be not secure for the outside attacks. In Table 4, if the maximum 
value of the integers in the database is 264, and the secure range query process need to be 
enabled with the integers that are large like this, the value of the security parameter λ 
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should only be 7. This is a lot less than the value in Tables 2 and 3. This parameter setting 
is very practical, if the security loss is not considered. For the integers whose values are 
220, the value of the security parameter λ should only be 5 that will be enough to handle 
the noise problem in the secure range query process, and be very efficient. For the 
problem that the value of p is more than the value of q, it is not useful to increase the 
value of q to solve it because this will decrease the efficiency again. Therefore, this 
parameter setting is not practical in security. 
After the comparison among the three tables, if the integers whose values are 220 need to 
be handled, the secret key generation should in Table 2 be used. If the integers whose 
values are 264 need to be handled, the secret key generation in Table 3 should be used, 
since the value of the parameter can balance the efficiency and security well in the secure 
range query process. This setting will also lose some security, but it will gain more 
benefits in efficiency to make the secure range query to be practical. 
Now, some experiments will be presented. Two experiments are executed with two 
different parameter settings. The two values of the integers in the database that is most 
practical to handle are 220 and 264, since 220 can fit most applications in the practical 
world, and 264 can handle almost all the practical applications, but will sacrifice some 
security. Therefore, these two most practical parameter settings will be chosen that can 
separately handle the 220 integers and 264 integers to do the experiments. In the practical 
applications, the data owner can choose these two parameter settings based on the 
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features of their databases and their needs. 
The experimental programs are written in Java programming language. Since in the 
secure range query process, there are a lot of operations that are with big integers, a Java 
class which is called as BigInteger is used from the Java library to handle large integers 
involved in the process. The structure of the program is given in Figure 8 
DataGenerator.java SHEenc.java
QueryGenerator.java
SRQ.java
UserIDGenerator.java
dec.java
Generates some random 
integers from a default 
experimental range.
data.txt
Generates keys and 
encrypts the random data. cData.txt
pk.txt
sk.txt
bk.txt
Generates upper and lower 
boundaries of the range 
query and ecrypts them.
Puts the encrypted 
boundaries, user ID, and 
attribute indexes in the 
request message.
query.txt
Executes range query 
process.
Generates user IDs.
userID.txt
cResults.txt Decrypts the encrypted 
results to get the real 
results.
results.txt
 
Figure 8: Experimental Program Structure 
 
 
95 
 
In the experiments, a cloud environment is simulated. Since most operations that need to 
be done on the side of the cloud service provide, a cloud service provider is chosen who 
can supply more powerful computational ability than the local computer as the cloud in 
the experiments. The cloud service provider that is chosen is SHARCNET. 
SHARCNET [39] is a consortium of Canadian academic institutions who share a network 
of high performance computers to support worldwide academic researches with its high 
computational ability. This is a perfect place for the experiments. goblin.sharcnet.ca is 
used which is a contributed gigabit Ethernet cluster from the SHARCNET. A system with 
an Intel Xeon CPU 2.53 GHz 16 cores processor and 12GB memory is used in the 
experiments. PuTTY, which is a free terminal emulator, serial console and network file 
transfer application is used to control the operations on cloud’s side from the local side, 
and WinSCP which is a free SFTP, SCP and FTP client for Microsoft Windows is used to 
organize the files on the cloud’s side from the local side. The command line that is used 
to run the program on the cloud’s side is “sqsub –r 15h –o results.txt java –Xmx512m 
NAME”. The systems in SHARCNET totally support the Java programs [40]. 
For the sides of the data owner and the user, a laptop iss used with an Intel(R) Core(TM) 
i7-3610QM CPU @ 2.30GHz and 4GB RAM in Microsoft Windows 8.1 operating 
system. This laptop is used as both the data owner and the user, since the data 
transmission costs between these two parties can be ignored. 
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Two parameter settings for the experiments are used. For the first experiment, the secret 
key generation is set to be p ∈ [2𝜆4−1, 2𝜆4), since this generation can handle the 220 
integers without too large security parameter λ. Since this setting is for the first 
experiment that is with the 220 integers, the integers that are generated randomly are all 
from [219, 220]. The security parameter λ is set as 10 since this is the least value to handle 
the 220 integers with p ∈ [2𝜆4−1, 2𝜆4) . For the second experiment, the secret key 
generation was set to be p ∈ [2𝜆5−1, 2𝜆5), since this generation is to handle the relatively 
largest data set which is the 264 integers also without  too large security parameter λ. 
Since this setting is for the second experiment with 264 integers, the integers that are 
generated randomly are all from [263, 264]. The security parameter λ was set as 10 since 
this is the least value to handle 264 integers with p ∈ [2𝜆5−1, 2𝜆5). There are also some 
other settings for the experiments. There are 1000 integers in the experimental database, 
which contains ten attributes, and each attribute having 100 integers. In the experimental 
range query process, 5 attributes are randomly selected to query, so that 500 integers 
could be queried. 
In the experiments, the results of the computational time and the size of the files that are 
transmitted in each communication round are separately recorded. To be specific, for the 
computational time, the encryption time, the query generating time, the secure range 
query process time, and the decryption time are recorded and analyzed separately. For the 
size of files that are transmitted in each communication round, the encrypted database for 
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data outsourcing, the request message that is sent to the cloud service provider to request 
a range query, the encrypted results that are sent back to the user are recorded and 
analyzed separately. 
 
Table 5： Experimental Results of Running Time for First Secret Key Generation 
 
Encryption Time Query Generating Time SRQ Time Decryption Time 
5107.77s 5.55ms 186.56m 221.58s 
5216.69s 5.64ms 181.64m 213.46s 
5172.5s 5.65ms 193.54m 218.46s 
5106.03s 5.51ms 191.42m 224.23s 
5120.09s 5.38ms 185.41m 214.26s 
4946.51s 5.59ms 193.84m 225.34s 
5205.27s 5.39ms 185.81m 227.13s 
5118.45s 5.54ms 189.12m 226.11s 
5217.14s 5.52ms 187.84m 224.71s 
5191.65s 5.62ms 192.88m 224.89s 
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4956.65s 5.61ms 183.21m 221.58s 
5013.49s 5.65ms 184.74m 226.05s 
5108.51s 5.64ms 184.23m 224.46s 
5040.51s 5.74ms 191.95m 217.48s 
5113.57s 5.47ms 184.74m 228.05s 
5194.49s 5.58ms 190.24m 223.8s 
5305.49s 5.6ms 191.48m 215.05s 
4997.79s 5.55ms 192.85m 224.27s 
4950.84s 5.74ms 189.28m 222.62s 
5005.25s 5.69ms 191.17m 229.55s 
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Table 6: Experimental Results of Transmitted File Sizes for First Secret Key Generation 
 
Encrypted Data Request Message Query Results 
645.18mb 1320kb 1.74gb 
667.94mb 1318kb 1.7gb 
664.04mb 1355kb 1.73gb 
662.38mb 1328kb 1.8gb 
644.52mb 1267kb 1.74gb 
639.21mb 1294kb 1.68gb 
653.51mb 1341kb 1.77gb 
663.08mb 1357kb 1.7gb 
634.44mb 1358kb 1.73gb 
654.78mb 1312kb 1.76gb 
625.58mb 1328kb 1.71gb 
656.14mb 1364kb 1.79gb 
633.71mb 1337kb 1.73gb 
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621.91mb 1339kb 1.72gb 
664.52mb 1288kb 1.75gb 
654.53mb 1360kb 1.74gb 
650.44mb 1304kb 1.8gb 
633.37mb 1341kb 1.68gb 
630.98mb 1366kb 1.76gb 
642.37mb 1314kb 1.76gb 
 
Table 7: Experimental Results of Running Time for Second Secret Key Generation 
 
Encryption Time Query Generating Time SRQ Time Decryption Time 
6823.14s 177.04ms 633.98m 649.35s 
6760.82s 172.97ms 651.29m 656.57s 
6698.66s 181.85ms 623.21m 652.93s 
6914.91s 182.55ms 608.86m 649.86s 
6849.26s 170.41ms 626.33m 632.02s 
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6718.06s 180.58ms 623.68m 629.25s 
6796.38s 178.78ms 643.41m 664.61s 
7013.53s 177.16ms 650.74m 664.31s 
6892.76s 175.69ms 627.98m 638.27s 
6720.48s 180.97ms 636.71m 673.06s 
7077.81s 180.92ms 625.75m 625.36s 
6599.13s 177.31ms 611.54m 659.27s 
6952.6s 172.11ms 609.92m 659.25s 
6555.34s 179.07ms 619.36m 672.1s 
6764.65s 178.46ms 630.74m 648.01s 
6900.83s 178.69ms 618.93m 626.62s 
6630.51s 180.19ms 652.5m 627.72s 
6822.08s 181.95ms 644.96m 657.89s 
6695.62s 173.82ms 657.63m 667.57s 
6783.45s 174.73ms 650.45m 665.7s 
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Table 8: Experimental Results of Transmitted File Sizes for Second Secret Key Generation 
 
Encrypted Data Request Message Query Results 
3375.05mb 6912kb 10.13gb 
3246.57mb 6989kb 10.33gb 
3273.86mb 6963kb 9.92gb 
3449.43mb 6749kb 9.85gb 
3311.59mb 7025kb 9.76gb 
3247.79mb 6673kb 9.8gb 
3480.62mb 7126kb 10.14gb 
3457.75mb 6866kb 9.82gb 
3504.05mb 6664kb 10.41gb 
3290.44mb 6925kb 10.45gb 
3465.48mb 6720kb 9.73gb 
3462.19mb 6950kb 10.38gb 
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3438.18mb 6747kb 9.94gb 
3345.21mb 6867kb 10.34gb 
3380.74mb 6725kb 9.94gb 
3470.17mb 6815kb 9.8gb 
3354.28mb 6654kb 10.52gb 
3256.56mb 6715kb 9.92gb 
3403.15mb 6822kb 10.18gb 
3318.17mb 6712kb 9.83gb 
For the computational time analysis, from Table 5, the encryption time is around 5100s. 
The keys generation process takes the most of this time, especially the public key 
generation process. Once the keys generation process is finished, the encryption process 
does not take much time. This is also the reason why the query generating time is so little 
that is just around 5.5ms because the query generating process is the process to encrypt 
two boundaries of the range query. The time of the secure range query process is 
relatively long that is around 185 minutes, but it happens on the cloud’s side. Therefore, it 
is still practical for using, since the decryption time is just around 220s. Thus, it is still 
efficient for the user, since the part that should be cared about most is the data owner and 
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the user. From Table 7, the results for p ∈ [2𝜆5−1, 2𝜆5) are very similar. The encryption 
time is around 6800s. Since this is a one-time process, it is acceptable, and this is for the 
264 integers. Still, the keys generation process takes the most of this time, especially the 
public key generation process. The query generating time is just around 170ms. The time 
of the secure range query process is relatively long that is around 630m, and the 
decryption time is around 650s. In general, for the integer data that is as large as 264, the 
efficiency of the secure range query process is still acceptable. 
For the data transmission costs analysis, from Table 6, the size of the whole encrypted 
data is around 650 MB. The size of the request message is very small which is around 
1300 KB. The size of the encrypted query results is pretty large which is around 1.7 GB. 
Although this size is large, with a good network that has a high data transmission rate, 
this size still can work. From Table 8, the results for p ∈ [2𝜆5−1, 2𝜆5) are larger. The size 
of the whole encrypted data is around 3350 MB. The size of the request message is larger 
which is around 6900 KB, but it is still not very large, so it does not affect the process. 
The size of the encrypted query results is pretty large which is around 10 GB. This size is 
very large. However, the values of the integer data in the experiment are around 264, so 
this is necessary to sacrifice some efficiency and security for handling larger integers in 
the secure range query process. 
For setting the number of fake bits that are appended to the encrypted binary forms of the 
integers, the value of one-half of the average bit-length of the integers in the dataset is a 
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very secure way. However, this will lead much more costs. This number is set with one 
third, one fourth, or even some smaller proportion of the average bit-length of the 
integers in the dataset. This needs to be decided by the data owner and according to his 
practical security requirements. 
In conclusion, when the secure range query process is with 220 integers, it is already 
practical for most applications. Although, with the 264 integers, the secure range query 
process seems to be slow and generate large result files, it is still successful to handle the 
larger numbers. No matter the p ∈ [2𝜆4−1, 2𝜆4) or p ∈ [2𝜆5−1, 2𝜆5), they all sacrifice 
some security to trade for some efficiency when the loss of the security is acceptable and 
worth for. Actually, when the data owner companies or enterprises have more 
computational power and higher data transmission rate, they can try to use even smaller 
secret key generations with some larger security parameter that can enable the secure 
range query process, and ensure the efficiency and security. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
6 Conclusions 
In this thesis, a secure range query process was proposed which is based on a somewhat 
homomorphic encryption scheme for a cloud environment. This encryption scheme can 
supply the homomorphic properties on some operations with binary encrypted integers. If 
there is an effective way to control the noise that is generated in the process, this 
encryption scheme can handle all the homomorphic operations, and it will turn to a fully 
homomorphic encryption scheme. All the integers are encrypted in their binary forms bit 
by bit. Then, a greater-than algorithm is used to compare two encrypted integers through 
all their bits. The results of the greater-than algorithm are not revealed to the cloud 
service provider. Different parameter settings are discussed and some settings that can 
make the secure range query process to be used in practical applications are found. The 
secure range query process is compared to the privacy-preserving range query process 
which is proposed in [35], and the advantages and disadvantages of the secure range 
query process compared to the privacy-preserving range query process are enumerated. In 
the experiments, two relatively practical parameter settings are proposed for 220 and 264 
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size integers. From the results of the experiments, if sacrifice some efficiency or security, 
or both, the secure range query process can be more functional. 
6.1 Future Work 
One of the future works of this thesis is to find a better secure comparison method as the 
results of the query are still very large. Another improvable part is that the user access 
control in this thesis cannot prevent the collusion between two users with different data 
access authorization. Some methods that are used in the secure range query process are 
also probably useful for some other kinds of query processes. This will contribute 
towards realizing the fully database as a service (DAAS) in a cloud environment. 
However, further researches about the fully homomorphic encryption scheme still will 
continue, since the fully homomorphic encryption scheme indeed is a powerful way to 
realize fully database as a service in a cloud environment. 
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Appendix A 
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme 
import java.math.BigInteger; 
import java.util.Random; 
import java.util.Scanner; 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.PrintWriter; 
import java.io.IOException; 
 
public class SHEenc  
{ 
 public static int sp = 7; 
    public static int skr = sp * sp * sp * sp * sp; 
    public static int sp5 = sp * sp * sp * sp * sp; 
    public static int bk = 10; 
    public static int n = 100; 
    public static int an = 10; 
    public static Random rnd = new Random(); 
    public static BigInteger two = BigInteger.valueOf(2); 
     
    public static BigInteger skGen() 
    { 
     BigInteger p = BigInteger.ZERO; 
     for (int i = 0; i < skr; i++) 
     { 
      if (i == (skr - 1)) 
      { 
       BigInteger head = BigInteger.ONE; 
       for (int j = 0; j < i; j++) 
       { 
        head = head.multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(2)); 
       } 
       p = p.add(head); 
      } 
      else 
      { 
       BigInteger body = new BigInteger(1, rnd); 
          for (int j = 0; j < i; j++) 
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          { 
           body = body.multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(2)); 
          } 
          p = p.add(body);  
      } 
     } 
     return p; 
    } 
     
    public static BigInteger pkGen(BigInteger p) 
    { 
     BigInteger q = BigInteger.ZERO; 
     for (int i = 0; i < sp5; i++) 
     { 
      if (i == (sp5 - 1)) 
      { 
       BigInteger head = BigInteger.ONE; 
       for (int j = 0; j < i; j++) 
       { 
        head = head.multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(2)); 
       } 
       q = q.add(head); 
      } 
      else 
      { 
       BigInteger body = new BigInteger(1, rnd); 
          for (int j = 0; j < i; j++) 
          { 
           body = body.multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(2)); 
          } 
          q = q.add(body);  
      } 
     } 
     return p.multiply(q); 
    } 
     
    public static BigInteger enc(BigInteger N, String m) 
    { 
     BigInteger M = new BigInteger(m); 
  BigInteger r = new BigInteger(sp, rnd); 
  BigInteger c = ((two.multiply(r)).add(M)).add(N); 
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  return c; 
    } 
     
    public static String dec(BigInteger p, BigInteger c) 
    { 
     BigInteger M = (c.mod(p)).mod(two); 
  String m = M.toString(); 
  return m; 
    } 
     
    public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException 
    { 
     String tData[][] = new String[an][n]; 
     long data[][] = new long[an][n]; 
     String bData[][] = new String[an][n]; 
     for (int i = 0; i < an; i++) 
     { 
      Scanner in = new Scanner(new File("data/" + i + ".txt")); 
      int index = 0; 
      while (in.hasNextLine()) 
         { 
          tData[i][index] = in.nextLine(); 
          data[i][index] = Long.parseLong(tData[i][index]); 
          bData[i][index] = Long.toBinaryString(data[i][index]); 
                index++; 
         } 
      in.close(); 
     } 
     File file = new File("cData"); 
     file.mkdirs(); 
     PrintWriter out1 = new PrintWriter("sk.txt"); 
     PrintWriter out2 = new PrintWriter("pk.txt"); 
     PrintWriter out3 = new PrintWriter("cData/pk.txt"); 
     PrintWriter out4 = new PrintWriter("bk.txt"); 
     BigInteger p = skGen(); 
     out1.println(p); 
     BigInteger N = pkGen(p); 
     out2.println(N); 
     out3.println(N); 
     out4.println(bk); 
     out1.close(); 
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     out2.close(); 
     out3.close(); 
     out4.close(); 
     for (int k = 0; k < an; k++) 
     { 
      File file1 = new File("cData/" + k); 
      file1.mkdirs(); 
      BigInteger cData[][] = new BigInteger[n][]; 
      for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) 
         { 
       File file2 = new File("cData/" + k + "/" + i); 
          file2.mkdirs(); 
       cData[i] = new BigInteger[bData[k][i].length() + bk]; 
          for (int j = 0; j < cData[i].length; j++) 
          { 
           PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter("cData/" + k + "/" + i + "/" + j + 
".txt"); 
           if (j < bData[k][i].length()) 
           { 
            cData[i][j] = enc(N, bData[k][i].substring(j, j+1)); 
           } 
           else 
           { 
            cData[i][j] = enc(N, "0"); 
           } 
           out.println(cData[i][j]); 
              out.close(); 
          } 
         } 
     } 
    } 
} 
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Appendix B 
Query Generator 
import java.math.BigInteger; 
import java.util.Random; 
import java.util.Scanner; 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.PrintWriter; 
import java.io.FileNotFoundException; 
 
public class QueryGenerator  
{ 
 public static int sp = 12; 
 public static long lower = (long)((Math.pow(2, 62) - 1) / 3); 
 public static long upper = lower * 2; 
    public static int userID = 7; 
    public static int an = 10; 
    public static Random rnd = new Random(); 
    public static BigInteger two = BigInteger.valueOf(2); 
     
    public static BigInteger enc(BigInteger N, String m) 
    { 
     BigInteger M = new BigInteger(m); 
  BigInteger r = new BigInteger(sp, rnd); 
  BigInteger c = ((two.multiply(r)).add(M)).add(N); 
  return c; 
    } 
  
 public static void main(String[] args) throws FileNotFoundException 
    { 
     Scanner in1 = new Scanner(new File("pk.txt")); 
     Scanner in2 = new Scanner(new File("bk.txt")); 
     Scanner in3 = new Scanner(new File("userID/" + userID + ".txt")); 
     PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter("querySenderA.txt"); 
     String pq = ""; 
     while (in1.hasNextLine()) 
     { 
      pq = pq + in1.nextLine(); 
     } 
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     String sbk = in2.nextLine(); 
     int bk = Integer.parseInt(sbk); 
     BigInteger N = new BigInteger(pq); 
     String sQU = Long.toBinaryString(upper); 
     String sQL = Long.toBinaryString(lower); 
     BigInteger cQU[] = new BigInteger[sQU.length() + bk]; 
     BigInteger cQL[] = new BigInteger[sQL.length() + bk]; 
     File file = new File("query"); 
     file.mkdirs(); 
     File file1 = new File("query/upper"); 
     file1.mkdirs(); 
     for (int i = 0; i < cQU.length; i++) 
     { 
      PrintWriter out1 = new PrintWriter("query/upper/" + i + ".txt"); 
      if (i < sQU.length()) 
      { 
       cQU[i] = enc(N, sQU.substring(i, i + 1)); 
       out1.println(cQU[i]); 
       out1.close(); 
      } 
      else 
      { 
       cQU[i] = enc(N, "0"); 
       out1.println(cQU[i]); 
       out1.close(); 
      } 
     } 
     File file2 = new File("query/lower"); 
     file2.mkdirs(); 
     for (int i = 0; i < cQL.length; i++) 
     { 
      PrintWriter out2 = new PrintWriter("query/lower/" + i + ".txt"); 
      if (i < sQL.length()) 
      { 
       cQL[i] = enc(N, sQL.substring(i, i + 1)); 
       out2.println(cQL[i]); 
       out2.close(); 
      } 
      else 
      { 
       cQL[i] = enc(N, "0"); 
 
 
119 
 
       out2.println(cQL[i]); 
       out2.close(); 
      } 
     } 
     String queryA[] = new String[an]; 
     int index = 0; 
     while (in3.hasNextLine()) 
     { 
      queryA[index] = in3.nextLine(); 
      index++; 
     } 
     out.println(userID); 
     out.println("="); 
     for (int i = 0; i < index; i++) 
     { 
      out.println(queryA[i]); 
     } 
     in1.close(); 
     in2.close(); 
     in3.close(); 
     out.close(); 
    } 
} 
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Appendix C 
Secure Range Query Process 
import java.math.BigInteger; 
import java.util.Random; 
import java.util.Scanner; 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.PrintWriter; 
import java.io.IOException; 
 
public class SRQ  
{ 
    public static int sp = 12; 
    public static int n = 100; 
    public static int an = 10; 
    public static Random rnd = new Random(); 
    public static BigInteger two = BigInteger.valueOf(2); 
     
 public static BigInteger xor(BigInteger c1, BigInteger c2) 
 { 
  BigInteger c = c1.add(c2); 
  return c; 
 } 
  
 public static BigInteger and(BigInteger c1, BigInteger c2) 
 { 
  BigInteger c = c1.multiply(c2); 
  return c; 
 } 
  
 public static BigInteger not(BigInteger c0, BigInteger N) 
 { 
  BigInteger encOne = enc(N, "1"); 
  BigInteger c = c0.add(encOne); 
  return c; 
 } 
  
 public static BigInteger or(BigInteger c1, BigInteger c2, BigInteger N) 
 { 
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  BigInteger c = xor(and(c1, c2), xor(and(not(c1, N), c2), and(c1, not(c2, N)))); 
  return c; 
 } 
  
 public static BigInteger gt(BigInteger cNum1[], BigInteger cNum2[], BigInteger N) 
 { 
  BigInteger result = enc(N, "0"); 
  BigInteger done = enc(N, "0"); 
  if(cNum1.length > cNum2.length) 
  { 
   return result = enc(N, "1"); 
  } 
  else if(cNum1.length < cNum2.length) 
  { 
   return result; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   for(int i = 0; i < cNum1.length; i++) 
   { 
    BigInteger t1 = and(cNum1[i], not(cNum2[i], N)); 
    BigInteger t2 = and(not(cNum1[i], N), cNum2[i]); 
    result = xor(and(done, result), and(not(done, N), t1)); 
    done = xor(done, and(not(done, N), or(t1, t2, N))); 
   } 
   return result; 
  } 
 } 
  
 public static BigInteger enc(BigInteger N, String m) 
    { 
     BigInteger M = new BigInteger(m); 
  BigInteger r = new BigInteger(sp, rnd); 
  BigInteger c = ((two.multiply(r)).add(M)).add(N); 
  return c; 
    } 
  
 public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException 
 { 
  Scanner in1 = new Scanner(new File("pk.txt")); 
  String pq = in1.nextLine(); 
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     BigInteger N = new BigInteger(pq); 
     in1.close(); 
     String sUL[][] = new String[2][]; 
     File file1 = new File("query/upper"); 
  File list1[] = file1.listFiles(); 
  sUL[0] = new String[list1.length]; 
  for (int i = 0; i < list1.length; i++) 
  { 
   Scanner in2 = new Scanner(new File("query/upper/" + i + ".txt")); 
   sUL[0][i] = in2.nextLine(); 
   in2.close(); 
  } 
  File file2 = new File("query/lower"); 
  File list2[] = file2.listFiles(); 
  sUL[1] = new String[list2.length]; 
  for (int i = 0; i < list2.length; i++) 
  { 
   Scanner in3 = new Scanner(new File("query/lower/" + i + ".txt")); 
   sUL[1][i] = in3.nextLine(); 
   in3.close(); 
  } 
        BigInteger cU[] = new BigInteger[list1.length]; 
        BigInteger cL[] = new BigInteger[list2.length]; 
        for (int i = 0; i < cU.length; i++) 
        { 
         cU[i] = new BigInteger(sUL[0][i]); 
        } 
        for (int i = 0; i < cL.length; i++) 
        { 
         cL[i] = new BigInteger(sUL[1][i]); 
        } 
     Scanner in4 = new Scanner(new File("querySenderA.txt")); 
     String userIDs = in4.nextLine(); 
     int userID = Integer.parseInt(userIDs); 
     in4.nextLine(); 
     String queryAs[] = new String[an]; 
     int QIndex = 0; 
     while (in4.hasNextLine()) 
     { 
      queryAs[QIndex] = in4.nextLine(); 
      QIndex++; 
 
 
123 
 
     } 
     int queryA[] = new int[QIndex]; 
     for (int i = 0; i < queryA.length; i++) 
     { 
      queryA[i] = Integer.parseInt(queryAs[i]); 
     } 
     in4.close(); 
     Scanner in5 = new Scanner(new File("userID/" + userID + ".txt")); 
     String aqueryAs[] = new String[an]; 
     int aQIndex = 0; 
     while (in5.hasNextLine()) 
     { 
      aqueryAs[aQIndex] = in5.nextLine(); 
      aQIndex++; 
     } 
     int aqueryA[] = new int[aQIndex]; 
     for (int i = 0; i< aqueryA.length; i++) 
     { 
      aqueryA[i] = Integer.parseInt(aqueryAs[i]); 
     } 
     in5.close(); 
     int fqueryAt[] = new int[an]; 
     int fQIndex = 0; 
     for (int i = 0; i < QIndex; i++) 
     { 
      for (int j = 0; j < aQIndex; j++) 
      { 
       if (queryA[i] == aqueryA[j]) 
       { 
        fqueryAt[fQIndex] = queryA[i]; 
        fQIndex++; 
       } 
      } 
     } 
     int fqueryA[] = new int[fQIndex]; 
     for (int i = 0; i < fqueryA.length; i++) 
     { 
      fqueryA[i] = fqueryAt[i]; 
     } 
  File file4 = new File("cResults"); 
     file4.mkdirs(); 
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  File subList3[][] = new File[fqueryA.length][]; 
  for (int i = 0; i < fqueryA.length; i++) 
     { 
   File subFile4 = new File("cResults/" + fqueryA[i]); 
   subFile4.mkdirs(); 
   File subFile3 = new File("cData/" + fqueryA[i]); 
   subList3[i] = subFile3.listFiles(); 
      File subsubList3[][] = new File[subList3[i].length][]; 
      String scData[][] = new String[subList3[i].length][]; 
      BigInteger cData[][] = new BigInteger[subList3[i].length][]; 
      BigInteger crData[][] = new BigInteger[subList3[i].length][]; 
      for (int j = 0; j < subList3[i].length; j++) 
      { 
       File subsubFile4 = new File("cResults/" + fqueryA[i] + "/" + j); 
       subsubFile4.mkdirs(); 
       File subsubFile3 = new File("cData/" + fqueryA[i] + "/" + j); 
       subsubList3[j] = subsubFile3.listFiles(); 
       scData[j] = new String[subsubList3[j].length]; 
       cData[j] = new BigInteger[subsubList3[j].length]; 
       crData[j] = new BigInteger[subsubList3[j].length]; 
       for (int k = 0; k < subsubList3[j].length; k++) 
       { 
        Scanner in = new Scanner(new File("cData/" + fqueryA[i] + "/" + j 
+ "/" + k + ".txt")); 
        scData[j][k] = in.nextLine(); 
        cData[j][k] = new BigInteger(scData[j][k]); 
           in.close(); 
       } 
       for (int k = 0; k < subsubList3[j].length; k++) 
       { 
        crData[j][k] = and(cData[j][k], xor(gt(cData[j], cL, N), gt(cData[j], 
cU, N))); 
           PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter("cResults/" + fqueryA[i] + "/" + j 
+ "/" + k + ".txt"); 
           out.println(crData[j][k]); 
           out.close(); 
       } 
      } 
     } 
 } 
} 
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Appendix D 
Security Parameter Calculator for Different 
Bit-Lengths 
import java.math.BigInteger; 
import java.io.PrintWriter; 
import java.io.FileNotFoundException; 
 
public class blANDspRelations  
{ 
 public static BigInteger two = BigInteger.valueOf(2); 
  
 public static void main(String[] args) throws FileNotFoundException 
    { 
  PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter("blANDspRelations.txt"); 
  for (int i = 1; i < 193; i++) 
  { 
   int sp = 2; 
      BigInteger result; 
   BigInteger done; 
   int temp; 
   do 
   { 
    BigInteger r2 = two.pow(sp + 1); 
    BigInteger t1 = two.pow(2 * sp + 3); 
       BigInteger t1ort2 = (two.pow(4 * sp + 7).add(two.pow(4 * sp + 
6))).add(two.pow(3 * sp + 5)); 
       BigInteger p = two.pow(sp * sp * sp * sp * sp - 1); 
    result = two.pow(sp + 1); 
       done = two.pow(sp + 1); 
       for (int j = 1; j <= i; j++) 
       { 
        result = (done.multiply(result)).add((done.add(r2)).multiply(t1)); 
        done = done.add((done.add(r2)).multiply(t1ort2)); 
       } 
       result = (result.add(result)).multiply(r2); 
       temp = result.compareTo(p); 
       sp++; 
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   } while (temp == 1); 
   System.out.println(sp - 1); 
   out.println(sp - 1); 
  } 
  out.close(); 
    } 
} 
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Appendix E 
Comparator of Sizes of Encrypted Query Results 
import java.math.BigInteger; 
import java.io.PrintWriter; 
import java.io.FileNotFoundException; 
 
public class cDataComparator  
{ 
    public static int sp = 10; 
    public static int n = 10; 
    public static BigInteger two = BigInteger.valueOf(2); 
    public static BigInteger three = BigInteger.valueOf(3); 
     
    public static void main(String[] args) throws FileNotFoundException 
    { 
     PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter("comparisonResults.txt"); 
     BigInteger temp1 = BigInteger.valueOf((int)(3 * Math.pow(2, n - 2))); 
     BigInteger temp2 = three.multiply(two.pow(1022)); 
     BigInteger PPRQ = temp2.modPow(temp1.add(temp2), 
three.multiply(two.pow(1023))); 
     int temp3 = (int)(Math.pow(sp, 5) + Math.pow(sp, 4)); 
     BigInteger temp4 = BigInteger.valueOf(n); 
     BigInteger SRQ = ((two.pow(temp3)).add(two.pow(sp + 1))).multiply(temp4); 
     out.println(PPRQ.subtract(SRQ));//the deviation is about 2^temp1 
     out.close(); 
    } 
} 
